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WHY DEFENSE ATTORNEYS CANNOT, BUT DO,
CARE ABOUT INNOCENCE
Robert P. Mosteller*
INTRODUCTION
At a time when special attention is being paid by the
public to innocence and the prosecution is being asked
to undertake new responsibility regarding erroneous
convictions,' this article reexamines the apparent irrelevance
of the question of the client's guilt or innocence to the
defendant's trial counsel. To date, concern for innocence has
been an "enabler" for procedural reforms that broadly benefit
those accused of crime,2 but that effect is not a given if
*J. Dickson Phillips Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina School of Law. I would like to thank Susan Bandes, Ken Broun, Mike
Corrado, Margareth Etienne, Jeff Powell, Rich Rosen, Larry Rosenthal, Fred
Zachiaras, and participants in the 2008 Criminal Procedure Discussion Forum
for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. In February 2008, the American Bar Association's (ABA's) House of
Delegates approved changes to Rule 3.8 of its Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that require the prosecutor to investigate innocence if the prosecutor
"knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood"
of the innocence of a convicted defendant and to seek to remedy the conviction
when the prosecutor "knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that"
the convicted defendant is innocent. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(g)-(h) (2008). Cf. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid
Wrongful Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors,
89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) (examining whether the disciplinary process, through
the requirement that prosecutors "provide competent representation" might
further the interest in not convicting the innocent, but ultimately concluding
that attention be paid to alternative mechanisms for guiding and controlling
prosecutorial behavior).
2. In her article about "framing" the wrongful conviction debate, Professor
Susan Bandes describes how, unlike the public's apathy toward arguments that
the death penalty is racially discriminatory and does not deter, revelations of
innocent defendants being sent to death row had a major impact on public
perceptions of injustice and support for reform. See Susan A. Bandes, Framing
Wrongful Convictions, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 5. She observed: "The development
that finally roused people to anger, or at least to a willingness to reexamine
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reforms can be targeted in ways that promise a different
impact for the innocent. My fear is that innocence may
become a "wedge issue,"3 dividing progressives concerned
with fairness from those principally concerned with
innocence, which may undercut support for some procedural
guarantees that do not promise to focus on the deserving
accused-the innocent. My goal is to explain in a new context
why the right to counsel for all should be strongly supported
by those committed to the innocent, just as it has long been
supported by those who prize procedural fairness without
regard to guilt or innocence.
I concentrate on defenders who represent indigent
defendants full-time. I do not challenge the frequent
observation that such defenders focus upon what can be
proved, rather than guilt or innocence,4 but I do contend that
defenders approach innocence somewhat differently than
guilt. With respect to whether defense counsel can "care"
about guilt or innocence, I reach the same conclusion that
many before me have reached: defense counsel institutionally
cannot care about guilt with regard to the degree of their
effort or the zealousness of their representation.'
As to the obviously related, but also distinct issue of
innocence,6 the same lack of concern holds because a new
their beliefs [about capital punishment], was the mounting evidence that
innocent people had been sent to death row." Id. at 8-9.
3. A "wedge issue" is defined as "a political issue that divides a candidate's
supporters or the members of a party." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1418 (11th ed. 2004).
4. See Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 509
n.100 (2000) ("In criminal defense, the focus must be on proof, not truth.").
5. Of course, whether defenders care about guilt rather than proof of guilt,
clear knowledge of guilt as a result of a client's confidential confession to
defense counsel certainly affects and restricts the way that counsel can defend
the case, even though the confidential statement is not admissible. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2002).
6. The statement that innocence is a related but distinct issue from guilt
deserves some explanation. If either innocence or guilt is known with certainty,
it negates the other position. Thus, in situations of clear evidence, innocence is
the opposite of guilt; they are two sides of a coin; they are more than related
because one decides the other. However, in situations of uncertainty, the
opposite of being guilty is being not guilty. In the vast majority of cases, some
degree of uncertainty prevails, and so there are three positions: guilty, not
guilty, and innocent. In such cases, the difference engendered by perceiving a
defendant or client primarily through the lens of possible innocence as opposed
to through the lens of probable guilt is substantial. That difference is one of the
subjects of this article.
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justification comes into play, even though the institutional
imperative may be less absolute.7 A special focus cannot be
given to innocence because defense attorneys have no special
and reliable ways to know innocence. They usually have no
means to establish innocence definitively. Like others in the
criminal justice system, they principally rely on the absence
of proof of guilt to mark innocence and, at their peril, use
intuition and subjective judgment as problematic guides. To
let special care about innocence matter in representing clients
would be to deny a full defense to the innocent who lack
either readily available objective proof or a compelling
persona. However, despite the insuperable difficulties,
defense attorneys do, in fact, care about innocence when they
believe they have encountered it.' The image of the hard-
boiled defense attorney unconcerned about innocence is
largely and necessarily accurate, but I emphasize that it is
not fully accurate.
Defense counsel focus on what is useful to the conduct of
their representation that relates to innocence-its proof.
When such proof is available, they develop it and present it.
Assuredly, when innocence is not present, they defend
anyway, but their reaction is connected to the irrelevance of
guilt to the duty to represent the client and does not dictate
the irrelevance of innocence.
Belief in innocence without proof is a different matter.
Unlike prosecutors, defense attorneys lack the power to
dismiss a case because they believe the defendant is, or may
be, innocent. In the courtroom, their belief is treated as
inadmissible, and therefore it is functionally irrelevant. In
contrast to guilt, where defense attorneys may have unique
personal knowledge because the client unequivocally
admitted guilt to them,9 a client's impassioned protestation of
7. Since most charged clients are apparently guilty (otherwise they would
not be charged), a defender providing inferior representation based on her
perception that the client is likely guilty would be institutionally intolerable
since it would disadvantage virtually all clients. If only an occasional client
falls into the category of likely innocent, a defender giving extra assistance to
that client might be tolerated practically precisely because it is rare or calls
forth extra resources, even though if generalized, it is intolerable because of
providing inferior representation to the apparently guilty.
8. I cannot empirically prove my assertion, but it is my experience from
years of contact with defenders that they are personally and often powerfully
affected when they encounter innocence and react differently in those cases.
9. As discussed later in this article, apparently incriminating statements
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innocence hardly constitutes knowledge of innocence.
Usually, the evidence defense attorneys possess that is not
also available to the prosecution merely supports the
likelihood of innocence, but does not prove it.
My experience is that defense attorneys do care about
innocence when they see it or they think they see it.
However, defenders who search among their clients for those
who are innocent are inviting personal and professional
destruction. A defender's belief in her client's innocence must
be backed by evidence; otherwise, it largely only torments the
defender and interferes with the performance of the
attorney's professional duty to all of her other clients.
Furthermore, because this can become disabling, it can harm
even a client the defender believes to be innocent.
In the end, I conclude that the concern for innocence will
likely continue to be handled individually by attorneys
responding to the torment by giving special attention to those
clients, and attempting to limit the damage that special
attention may cause to others who they represent. I believe
there is a theoretical possibility for a systemic response to
innocence by providing additional resources where strong
objective evidence of innocence exists, but, unfortunately, no
practical means of implementation. Moreover, an attempt
actually to produce extra resources for particularly worthy
defendants is either not feasible or will prove
counterproductive. Instead, I suggest that the public
by clients that are not unequivocal statements of guilt are indicators of guilt but
do not necessarily prove it. See infra note 80 and accompanying text. Thus,
even a defense attorney's inside knowledge of evidence supporting guilt does not
necessarily prove guilt. For example, innocent defendants often change alibis,
which is an obvious and valid indicator of fabrication. Ronald Cotton, an
innocent defendant who spent years in prison for a crime DNA evidence and the
actual perpetrator's confession proved he did not commit, initially gave the
police an incorrect alibi. See EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF
DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 43-44 (1996); Richard
A. Rosen, Innocence and Death, 82 N.C. L. REV. 61, 72 n.35 (2003). If his
attorney's memory is correct, he provided two additional versions of
the alibi to his lawyer. See Frontline: What Jennifer Saw (PBS
television broadcast Feb. 25, 1997), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/interviews/moseley.html.
Innocent defendants may change stories because they initially misremember
where they were at the critical time or who they were with, as seems to have
been the situation with Cotton. Even if innocent, clients may lie to their
attorney because they were with no one and have no alibi.
[Vol:50
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recognize that any increased concern for innocence should
result in more resources for all defenders for all cases. Where
not objectively verifiable, innocence will be known by the
defendant and perhaps others, but for various reasons, their
knowledge will be contestable and discounted. Sometimes, of
necessity, the issue of innocence must be left for the jury, and
a thorough presentation of all the available evidence by
defense counsel with adequate resources to perform the task
is our inadequate, but best, response.
In writing this article, I depend heavily on my personal
experiences as a defense attorney and tangentially on my love
of movies. I practiced law for seven years as a public
defender with the Washington, D.C. Public Defender Service
(PDS) before I started teaching law.' ° One of my many
"favorite" movies is The Fugitive," which I believe provides
the general attitude of many defense attorneys toward claims
of innocence.
In the movie, Dr. Richard Kimble, played by Harrison
Ford, is charged with murdering his wife, a crime he
vigorously insists he did not commit. He is convicted of the
murder and sentenced to be executed. When the bus
transporting him to prison to await his execution has an
accident, he escapes. Hot on his trail is U.S. Marshal Samuel
Gerard, played by Tommy Lee Jones.
Gerard catches up to Kimble at the end of a storm drain
that empties into an enormous spillway. A memorable
exchange transpires just before Kimble jumps over the edge
in a desperate effort to remain free so he can prove his
innocence. Kimble pleads, "I didn't kill my wife." Gerard
replies with the stunning words, "I don't care."
Gerard's response-"I don't care"-with a slight
recasting, described below, captures my position as a public
defender in response to the almost inevitable claim by my
10. Professor Barbara Babcock has described PDS as "an exemplary
institution" that is "characterized by extensive training, reasonable caseloads,
and the ability to attract young lawyers with impressive credentials to do the
work." Barbara A. Babcock, Book Review, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 310, 312
(1984-1985) (reviewing JAMES S. KUNEN, "How CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE
PEOPLE?": THE MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983)). At PDS, I tried cases
and argued appeals for individual clients. I also served as Training Director
and ultimately Chief of the Trial Division, positions in which I conferred with
and advised colleagues regarding their cases.
11. THE FUGITIVE (Warner Bros. 1993).
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clients that they were innocent. It is the attitude of, I believe,
most conscientious defenders of indigent defendants who do
not get to choose their clients. 2 When a client tells his
lawyer, as my clients did, even if apparently clearly guilty, "I
didn't do it; I am innocent," the defense attorney's reflexive,
but unspoken, response is, "I don't care." Upon more careful
thought, at least three more nuanced responses might be
made: (1) "My job is to defend you zealously whether guilty or
innocent, and I can't ethically shortchange anyone, even if
what you say is by every demonstrable measure false"; (2) "I
don't care because it cannot matter to my effort if it turns out
I do not believe you"; and (3) "I am not a trained lie detector
and, moreover, what I believe is treated by the law as
irrelevant, so I will ignore your precise claim and convert
your statement into an emphatic request to find evidence of
innocence or another way to win my case."
This attitude about the irrelevance of the client's guilt
and, effectively, in most situations ignoring his specific claim
of innocence, follows from the ethos that animated one of the
early ABA statements about the necessary attitude to defend
all those charged with crime. Canon 5 states:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of a
person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion
as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons,
victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied
proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the
lawyer is bound by all fair and honorable means, to
present every defense that the law of the land permits, to
the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty,
but by due process of law.13
The above is not only a statement of the right of the guilty to
a defense, but it is also a statement of the importance of
providing a defense to innocent clients, despite the lawyer's
lack of personal belief in their innocence.
This expression of professional authorization took on
further meaning when the Supreme Court established, under
the Sixth Amendment, a broad right of effective assistance of
12. Clients are assigned either by a judge or by an administrator. Typically,
such lawyers are not allowed to pick and choose among clients, although they
may be limited to specific types of cases based on experience or expertise.
13. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908).
[Vol:50
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counsel for indigent defendants. 14  As supplemented by
professional norms first stated in the Canons of Professional
Ethics, the duty is to defend everyone, including the guilty,
with warm zeal, 5  within the limits of other ethical
constraints, such as the requirements of candor to the
tribunal. 6 Attorneys are thus understood ethically to have
a duty to defend everyone fully and a constitutional
obligation to defend at least to a level to satisfy the basic
requirements of effective assistance. 7 Generally, to give
better representation to the apparently or likely innocent
would result in providing the apparently or likely guilty (but
perhaps innocent) with second-class treatment. Neither
constitutional principles" nor ethical mandates appear to
provide support for such two-tiered services.
My initial reaction that "I don't care" about claims of
innocence and even more about guilt is consistent with Canon
5, but goes further than the canon's statement of permission
to defend those whom the lawyer might believe to be guilty.
14. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963), the Court held
that state courts are required to provide counsel to indigent criminal defendants
charged with felonies under the Sixth Amendment. Its progeny extended the
right to misdemeanor cases when a sentence of imprisonment is imposed. See
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662-72 (2002) (requiring counsel where the
defendant is sentenced to imprisonment even that sentence was initially
suspended).
15. See CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (directing lawyers to
give "entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance
and defense of his rights and the exertion of [the lawyer's] utmost learning and
ability").
16. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2008) (imposing duty of
candor with the tribunal).
17. More precisely, the effective constitutional requirement is to avoid
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
684-96 (1984) (defining the minimal obligation where counsel is constitutionally
guaranteed as that of effective assistance, which is denied when counsel's
performance is deficient and prejudices the client to the extent of denying a fair
trial). The failure of Strickland to ensure adequate representation is the subject
of a substantial literature. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has
No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986). However, this
subject is beyond the scope of this article.
18. See Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 469-70 (9th Cir. 2003)
(stating that the constitutional requirement is that "every criminal defendant
receive adequate representation, regardless of guilt or innocence" in suit against
the public defender regarding a policy of using the results of defendants'
polygraph examinations to allocate office investigative and legal resources,
which allegedly resulted in inadequate resources for an effective defense for
clients who appeared to be guilty).
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One powerful argument that I accepted when I was practicing
is that it would be intolerable to the system of
constitutionally mandated defense if the indigent accused had
to first convince his or her own defense attorney of innocence
before the client could expect a full defense. The idea that
two levels of representation for indigent defendants-a lower
level for defendants, perhaps the majority, believed by their
lawyers to be guilty and a higher level of effort for those
whom the lawyer believed were innocent-was and is
repugnant to me.
However, the initial response does not mean that
innocence or the client's claim of innocence is irrelevant to the
work of the defense attorney. U.S. Marshal Gerard's job was
to arrest Kimble, even if he believed he was innocent.19
Nevertheless, his conduct as the movie progresses shows a
professional who clearly did care at an important level about
innocence. When he encountered evidence that suggested
Kimble was telling the truth during his quest to arrest him,
Gerard paid attention to the evidence and sought
confirmation. When the weight of that evidence became
compelling, Gerard continued with his task of arresting
Kimble, but he first protected Kimble's life. After he had
taken Kimble into custody, Gerard removed the handcuffs as
he drove away, presumably toward resolution of the charges
by higher authorities.
One message of this article is the importance of an
attitude of the sort "I don't care" about guilt or innocence for
defense attorneys whose job is to defend all comers. I
examine the enormous practical importance of this attitude to
the professional role and emotional well-being of a trial-level
public defender. I hope to develop an understanding-even
for those concerned primarily, and perhaps exclusively, with
innocence-why this response is the necessary initial position
that, in many cases, never changes. Another point of this
article is to highlight the difficulty of a defense lawyer
uniquely knowing that her client is innocent. The client's
statement of innocence, even if impassioned and subjectively
convincing, constitutes virtually no evidence at all. Moreover,
19. Thus, I am arguing that Gerard meant his job did not change even if he
believed Kimble, just as a defense attorney's job does not change even if she
disbelieves the client.
[Vol:50
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because belief in innocence without facts to back up that
belief is potentially destructive, it is extremely unwise
professionally for a defense attorney to allow herself to
believe in innocence based on the client's personal
persuasiveness. Nevertheless, for defense attorneys, much as
it was for Gerard, "I don't care" is not wholly accurate.
Defense attorneys may be officially prohibited from caring
about guilt, but I observe that they sometimes cannot avoid
caring about innocence.
Before I go further, I want to set out an important factual
claim: in my experience, those charged with very serious
offenses do not readily admit guilt to their attorney, despite
assurances of confidentiality. One of my mentors at PDS had
an insight, which I am convinced is accurate. He said that I
might personally operate under the principle of treating all
defendants, guilty or innocent, equally, but my clients did not
believe that to be true. He contended that clients believe that
defense attorneys will give better representation to clients
whom they believe are innocent, and that assumption by
clients helps explain why most clients assert their innocence
to their attorneys. They could not believe their lawyers would
really represent them with full vigor if the lawyer believed
the client guilty, so the guilty lied. Clients would say in our
initial interview, "I am innocent," which they maintained
even as the evidence mounted and the client's explanation of
how he or she was innocent had to be changed as more of the
prosecution's evidence was revealed.2 ° At some point in most
cases, when accepting a plea offer presented the best objective
outcome for the client, the often quite difficult process of the
client acknowledging guilt began.
I emphasize a point I made earlier. An important reason
why "I don't care" that a client is innocent is a proper initial
response is because I almost never could know whether the
claim was true. Often I would have the client's protestations
of innocence combined with overwhelming evidence of guilt,
but I still had no surefire way to distinguish between
reasonable belief in guilt and knowledge of it. But when it
20. Professor Margaret Raymond had the same experience as a practicing
attorney that I did; her clients almost always proclaimed their innocence. See
Margaret Raymond, The Problem With Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 460
(2001). She also assumed the clients did so to win the defense attorney's full
commitment to the client's defense. See id.
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comes to innocence, the uncertainty is generally far more
serious. When I initially encountered my clients in lockup
before their first court appearance, the prosecution had
already made an initial decision to file charges. It had not
uncovered evidence of innocence, and although many cases
would be dismissed because the evidence was weak, I was
unlikely to find clear evidence of innocence that the
government had missed. If the client was innocent, the best I
would likely be able to produce was some weaknesses in the
government's case or evidence of innocence that was
equivocal, or subject to challenge.21 I would typically not be
able to corroborate definitively any belief I might have in
innocence, and if the amount of effort I expended depended on
my belief, I would be giving some clients who were, in fact,
innocent a second rate treatment when, if innocence has
special importance, they most needed my best efforts. They
were the ones with no persuasive evidence to verify their
claim, and any diminishment of my effort, based on an
assessment by their appointed advocate, would further skew
the chances of a proper outcome.
I want to be forthright about my personal motivations.
Like most defenders, I was not focused principally or directly
on innocence. In common with other defenders as described
later,22 I had multiple motivations, and the chief one was an
idea of fairness. For some reason that is part of my personal
value system; I believed that everyone, even the clearly
guilty, was entitled to an attorney working as hard as
possible for their defense. I believe that guardians are
needed to keep the system honest. I do not claim that most
devoted defense attorneys justify their work to themselves
exclusively or primarily as protectors of the innocent. That
portrayal would not be true to their multiple motivations and
roles, but it would terribly shortchange their importance in
protecting the innocent, if the largely necessary "I don't care"
attitude were misunderstood as the full and literal
understanding of defenders' position, and particularly their
function.
21. Alibi evidence from those who know the defendant or are related to him
is the most likely exculpatory evidence in identification cases, and such
evidence is usually subject to rather effective challenge because it depends
critically on imperfect human memories from biased witnesses.
22. See infra Part V.
[Vol:50
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During my seven years at PDS, I practiced most days as
if I did not care about guilt or innocence.23 I believe, even in
this changed environment that emphasizes innocence, I
would largely act the same today. But, although I tried to act
as if I did not care about the guilt/innocence issue, I was not
neutral in my operating assumptions. Professor Daniel
Givelber, who has observed that the criminal justice system,
including defense attorneys, assumes that trials are
conducted among those who are guilty to determine which
of the guilty are convicted.24 Guilt seemed the realistic
operating assumption that appeared accurate for most cases.
Both innocent and guilty clients said they were innocent.
How is one to know? It is hard as a human being not to
develop an opinion on the issue of guilt and, in many cases,
innocence. The operating command is to disregard those
opinions, which I put in terms of not caring. We know from
the DNA exonerations that the assumptions of the system
and, no doubt, defenders were inaccurate for a substantial
number of defendants. I practiced before those revelations,
but even today, after those revelations, the systemic
assumption of guilt operates throughout the actors in the
system, as admittedly it should based on overall probabilities.
Nevertheless, that assumption is in error in some
unknowable number of cases. I will make my point even
more explicitly. Defense counsel, including myself, have
believed some of their innocent clients were guilty and any
change in societal attitudes caused by DNA exonerations has
not altered that picture.
23. However, as the case I describe at the beginning of the next part as that
of Innocent Client #1 demonstrates, I did act somewhat differently when I saw
what I thought was substantial evidence of innocence.
24. See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions:
Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1394-95 (1997)
(observing that the criminal justice system operates on the general assumption
of the guilt of all those charged and challenging the obvious flaws in this
assumption).
In jurisdictions where prosecutors are of high quality and act generally
ethically, the assumption that defendants are guilty may be stronger. This is
because others may assume the prosecutorial screening process has excluded
the guilty, and this will be true for the relatively obvious cases. The prosecutors
I faced were from the U.S. Attorney's Office and I had a very positive general
impression of my opponents. However, as this article argues, innocence is
frequently difficult to recognize, and although clearly better than situations
where prosecutors do not screen carefully, respect for the quality and ethics of
prosecutors leads to a potentially dangerous false sense of confidence.
20101
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Some of my explanations regarding the motivations of
and justifications for those who defend the indigent are
relatively standard. However, I present these explanations to
be reexamined at this different time when society and
scholars put greater emphasis on innocence. Rather than
trial counsel attempting to treat the innocent and guilty
differently, my analysis leads instead to a vigorous defense of
everyone.
Part I discusses two cases that I had as a public defender
where my clients, through flukes, were shown to be innocent.
Absent those chance events, the cases would have likely gone
to trial and one or both would have been convicted. I discuss
my personal reactions then, and my assessment now, of the
issues presented by those cases. In Part II, I explore how
some issues become wedges that divide progressives in
criminal justice issues. I examine one proposal to prohibit the
full defense of some clearly guilty clients, which seems to
have that unfortunate potential effect for a vigorous defense
of all.
In Part III, I turn to one of the prime reasons why any
effort to isolate the innocent, with regard to the work of trial-
level defenders, is dangerous and, I believe, inevitably
misguided. Not even defense lawyers can actually know
whether their clients are innocent. This point is frequently
stated, but, I suspect, not actually believed even by
sophisticated observers. I pay particular attention to the
group of clients who may be described as "the usual suspects."
For clients of this type, defense counsel, like others, are likely
to believe the client is guilty even if innocent because of prior
similar conduct, which renders particularly pernicious any
impact subjective belief in guilt may have on attorney zeal.
In Part IV, I work through two sets of problems faced by
defenders. The first is the way defenders effectively allocate
the scarce resource of their time among the clients within
their case load. There, I argue that most attorneys do it in a
way that maximizes total client welfare, assuming each client
values freedom equally, and attempts to reach the same level
of diminishing productivity for each client. The system does
not include, nor would it easily accommodate, a component
related to guilt or innocence. I also array subjective reactions
of lawyers across various levels of objective proof of guilt and
illustrate the pernicious potential of concern about guilt to
[Vol:50
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the role assigned to lawyers to help protect those who are
actually innocent but appear guilty. In Part V, I examine the
mindset and motivations of attorneys who regularly represent
indigent defendants. Lawyers of this type have many ways to
support themselves and to justify their efforts. I explore here
the difficulty and, perhaps, the impossibility of surviving
professionally and personally if concern about the guilt of
clients regularly enters a defender's thoughts.
In Part VI, I attempt both to recognize the reality at the
individual level-that defense lawyers do, in fact, care deeply
about innocence when they encounter apparent evidence of
it-and to explore the possibility of a systemic response that
would provide additional resources to the defense when
strong objective evidence of innocence is found. I conclude,
however, that the only effective response would be for the
increased concern for innocence to fuel a drive to increase
overall funding for defender services. Barring that outcome,
unfortunately, only an occasional individual response is
practical, even though it is admittedly both inadequate and
problematic.
I. MY EXPERIENCES WITH INNOCENT CLIENTS AS A TRIAL
ATTORNEY
I discuss two cases I handled while at PDS where my
clients were arrested and charged, but were shown to be
factually innocent. In both cases, the charges were ultimately
dismissed. I describe these two cases in some detail and treat
another more summarily in a footnote,25 making alterations
to all to avoid revealing client confidences that were
not divulged in connection with the dismissals. Because
identification issues are at the core of these cases, I note at
25. See infra note 26. The case is discussed only in a footnote because its
lessons are largely duplicative.
All three cases were dismissed because the prosecution was convinced, not
only of its inability to prove guilt, but of the client's innocence, an assessment
with which I concur. I represented one other client whose case was dismissed
after indictment. See infra Part III. I treat it somewhat differently in my mind
and in this article because I was not confident whether he was innocent or,
rather, that he was not guilty because the government's witness was lying about
much of her testimony. This case illustrates the difficulty of knowing, even
when a defense attorney has strong evidence, that the client is truly innocent
rather than not provably guilty by the evidence. I describe this client as "not
guilty" rather than "innocent."
2010]
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the outset that none of the three cases involved cross-racial
identifications.
A. Innocent Client #1: Assault with Intent to Commit Rape
and Related Rape Defendant
The case I am about to describe is truly a scary one. This
innocent young man could have spent the rest of his life in
prison except for a fluke.
At the time I worked there, new lawyers at PDS began
practice handling juvenile delinquency cases. After roughly a
year, the training/practice rotation took new attorneys to
adult misdemeanors and, very shortly thereafter, to low-
grade felonies-no armed offenses, restricted to a maximum
of ten years in prison. At this point in my trial experience, I
was appointed to represent Innocent Client #1, who was
charged with assault with intent to commit rape. He was
accused of attempting to rape a young woman whom he
threatened and walked to a nearby vacant building. Before
he could commit the sexual assault, a curious bystander
entered the building, and the man fled. The victim reported
the crime immediately, but no one was arrested. A few days
later, she hailed a police officer and told him about the earlier
crime, pointing out a man she identified as the offender who
was sitting on a nearby wall. At the end of the case, I learned
she had told a detective that she was confident of her
identification because the man was staring at her. She told
the officer that she recognized the man, but also told him that
she surmised that he must have recognized her from the
attempted rape, because she had never otherwise met the
man.
A lineup was ordered, and what occurred at the lineup
showed that the crime was a gateway to something far more
serious than I had expected from my assignment to an
attempted sexual assault. Lineups in Washington, D.C. at
that time were conducted very professionally. The suspects
stood behind one-way glass with cameras filming both them
and each witness as he or she entered the room and
attempted an identification. The same person managed all
lineups. He was not involved in investigating crime and read
from a standard script that differed only as to the date, time,
location, and type of crime. In the typical lineup, all the men
in it were suspects in one or more crimes, and they served as
[Vol:50
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fillers for the other crimes for which others in the lineup were
the suspect.
When I was called forward for the lineup, a young woman
entered the room, and the officer read the standard script for
the charged crime. When asked whether she recognized
anyone in the line who was involved in that crime, she
answered yes and confidently picked my client.
Another young woman was then escorted into the lineup
room. This time the officer's script concerned a different
crime-a rape that occurred a few days after my client's
arrest. She too picked my client, but stated that he "looked
like" the man who raped her. I was startled in two ways by
the second witness. I had no indication that my client was a
suspect in any other crime, and if my memory served me, he
was in jail at the time of the later crime.
I went back to my office and checked. As I thought, my
client was still in jail on the day of the second crime because
his mother had not been able to post the bond imposed until
the day after that rape occurred. The next morning, I
obtained from the police records department the initial police
report in the second case. Although the report was not
detailed, the description provided of the perpetrator and the
way he was dressed matched the information provided to the
police by the victim in my case, and he isolated the victim in
similar ways in both cases.
Earlier, when I worked in juvenile court, I encountered
one innocent client.26 Although the prosecution's case was not
26. I encountered my first innocence case, Innocence Client J (Juvenile),
during my first year of practice as I worked in juvenile court. At PDS, after a
period of formal training, lawyers began work in juvenile court. The cases
assigned to brand-new attorneys often involved serious. crimes, but because of
the limited nature of maximum sentences in juvenile court, this is where
practice began. One of my early cases involved a robbery attempt by an
unarmed adolescent male who tried to snatch a woman's purse. She resisted
and kept her purse, but called the police. Several days later, she hailed a
passing patrol officer to have him arrest a young man she recognized as the
assailant.
When I met my client, Innocent Client J, after his arrest, he vigorously
denied that he was guilty. He knew nothing about the offense and said he did
not do things like that. He said he had no idea who the complainant was
because he never saw anyone point him out when he was arrested. All he knew
was that one moment he was going about his business outside on the public
street near his home, and the next he was placed under arrest.
I investigated his alibi and his background. His alibi was inconclusive. The
crime took place after school on an ordinary day some time before the arrest.
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particularly strong, I had nothing beyond the protestations of
my client to indicate innocence, and with that client, I had no
intuition about innocence. Innocent Client #1 struck me
differently. The reason was probably because he had been
represented a few years earlier by another lawyer in the
office. Although that indicated he had a criminal record, the
crime was a petty theft, and he was only peripherally
involved. The other lawyer suggested that this new crime did
not seem to fit the hapless young man she had represented.
Even though an attempt and not a completed sexual assault,
the new offense seemed far too serious for the naive and inept
person I met in lockup who very much still fit the person she
described to me.
Even before the tentative identification, I had sent an
investigator to interview his family members, who were
serving as his alibi witnesses. "Family alibis" are typically
seen as weak evidence by jurors under the theory that almost
anyone should be able to get blood relatives to lie for them.
They resemble the ancient oath helpers27 and are something
He could not pinpoint what he was doing that day, and likely would have been
on his way home from school or in his home without any adult present. He thus
had no alibi, but given the time of day and his explanation, I made little of it as
a possible indicator of guilt, but much regretted the lack of any helpful evidence.
His background was far more powerful. He had never been arrested and
was understood to be one of the good kids in the neighborhood. We would
present the best alibi we could but would depend on impressive character
evidence. Although the crime was technically an attempted robbery, it was not,
in fact, violent, and probation was virtually certain even if the client were
convicted.
Rather than going to trial, the prosecution dismissed the case. I received a
phone call one day from the prosecutor assigned to the case. He told me that
the victim had called him and told him that she had apparently made a
mistake. She had encountered the person whom she had pointed out on the
street. She assumed in seeing her, the young man would run away or show
some sign of encountering his accuser. Instead, he clearly had no idea who she
was. On closer inspection and given his totally innocent reaction to her, she
realized she had initially identified the wrong person. An adolescent male had
attempted to rob her, but it was not the person she had identified earlier. The
charges were dropped.
27. Evidence scholar John Henry Wigmore described "oath helpers" as
coming from a primitive mode of trial when the persons who attended and
"testified" on behalf of the parties were not witnesses, but rather individuals
"whose mere oath, taken by the prescribed number of persons and in the proper
form, the issue of the cause was determined." 3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 896, at 659 (James H. Chadbourn ed.,
1970). They were chosen, naturally and usually, from among the relatives and
adherents of either party." Id. Others have suggested that because of their
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like indirect character evidence-the value of the evidence is
based largely on how impressive or unimpressive the family
members are as people more than precisely what they say.
This alibi did not move outside the general category of a
family alibi, but it met the second issue raised by all alibis,
which is: why would the witnesses remember that the
defendant was with them at the specific time of the crime?
This defendant was not arrested until days after the crime, on
what was called in Washington, D.C., a "second sighting."
Thus, the alibi witnesses were required to remember a night
long before the arrest, which they had no contemporaneous
reason to associate with a crime that should have been
unknown to them.
However, the date should have been independently
memorable. The defendant's sister had just come home from
the hospital after giving birth. The family lived in very tight
quarters with multiple adults in the same bedroom, in
addition to my client, his sister, and the newborn baby.
Everyone remembered clearly that the baby was very fussy
that night and kept waking them. They knew my client was
home the entire night, including the time when the crime
occurred. Perhaps stupidly, before I had corroborated the
date my client's sister and her baby were released from the
hospital, I asked the investigator to take written witness
statements. When we obtained the medical records, they
corroborated the date asserted, but I learned that memories
of alibi witnesses of an event, like the date of the return home
from the hospital, are frequently made in error. Foolishly or
not, I had at an early date locked my client's family into an
alibi story that dovetailed perfectly with external
independent records.
As soon as I obtained the police report, I sent my
investigator to interview the rape victim, who fortunately was
willing to talk with him. He came back with a signed
statement from her. The statement, which was more detailed
than the initial police report, matched up entirely with the
attempted rape up to the point the perpetrator fled. I was
connection to the accused and the community, the failure to obtain the requisite
oath helpers or inadequate oath helpers was a rough indicator that the
community knew or believed the accused to be guilty. See Trisha Olson, Of
Enchantment: The Passing of the Ordeals and the Rise of the Jury Trial, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 124 (2000).
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convinced that the same man had done both crimes, and as a
result of my client being in jail when the rape occurred, it
could not be him.
My client was charged with the rape, arrested again,
jailed on a bond his family could afford, and indicted. His
case was assigned to one of the two judges handling the most
serious offenses-prosecutions for first-degree murder, rape,
and particularly complex serious criminal cases. This
particular judge was hostile to the defense and gave very
harsh sentences. The client faced trial in a difficult
environment, and I was confident that if convicted, he would
spend most of the rest of his life in prison.
The veteran Assistant District Attorney assigned to
handle the case was conservative in his approach to cases,
giving, for example, quite limited discovery, but he was very
professional, smart, and fair. I decided to present my client's
case of innocence to him because I trusted him to consider the
information seriously and fairly. When we met, I told him
straight out that I believed my client was innocent. I gave
him everything I had developed in the case and told him so,
including the signed alibi statements and even some evidence
that indirectly could have been harmful if the client went to
trial.
In the end, the prosecutor dismissed the case. He told me
that the family alibi was interesting, but did not move him.
What did move him was the corroboration that the Sex
Crimes detectives gave regarding the similarity between the
physical descriptions of the perpetrators and the events,
coupled with the uniqueness of the statements made by the
perpetrator to the victims. I will not go into details and do
not know them fully, but he said the sexual modus operandi
was quite distinctive and absolutely identical between the
crimes up until the unexpected appearance of a witness who
caused the perpetrator to flee. The experienced Sex Crimes
detectives were absolutely convinced that the same man
committed both crimes. The prosecutor said the police had
checked and double checked jail records to be sure my client
had not actually been released until the day after the rape,
and he asked me if I knew anything to the contrary, which I
told him I did not.
The prosecutor had told me that he was still troubled by
what he considered corroborating evidence for the victim's
[Vol:50
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identification in my case-that my client had indicated
recognition of the victim by staring at her at the time of the
second sighting.2" In the prosecutor's judgment, that
apparent corroboration was not enough to undercut the
exonerating effect of the sexual modus operandi evidence, but
it bothered him, and he asked for an explanation. When I
later asked my client, he responded instantly with an
explanation that struck me as totally plausible. However, the
prosecutor who had not seen its spontaneity seemed less
impressed when I relayed it to him, and I am not at all sure a
jury would have believed the explanation. My client admitted
that he did indeed stare at the young woman, but not because
of recognition. He stared because she was attractive, and he
was well aware his appearance was, at best, ordinary. He
was not accustomed to having young women stare at him
when he was out on the street, and certainly not anyone so
attractive.29 She was staring right at him, and he freely
admitted staring back.
This is a particularly frightening case because proof of
innocence relied so much on chance. Had Innocent Client #1's
mother posted bond a day earlier, the proof of his innocence-
the identical sexual modus operandi-would have been
introduced as proof of his guilt rather than his innocence. 0
There was no biological trace evidence left in my case because
the sexual assault was interrupted. There should have been
trace evidence in the rape case, but in a day before DNA
typing, whether it would have exculpated my client, rather
than be ambiguous or supportive of guilt, is uncertain. His
28. Interestingly, it was exactly the opposite reaction-failure of the
previously identified defendant to recognize the victim in a second
confrontation-that had led to the exoneration of an earlier juvenile client. See
supra note 26 and accompanying text.
29. The explanation had instant resonance with me. At lineups, defense
counsel is not given names of witnesses. We were trained to write down a
description of the witnesses who appear to provide some basis for identifying
which ones are the government's witnesses and later linking lineup responses
with witnesses. His perceptions were accurate.
30. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and common law principles that
predated the rule permit the introduction of "other crimes" evidence to show
identity. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Thus, the other offense would have been
admissible to win a conviction against my client on the assault with intent to
rape case, and he would, effectively, have to defend against two accusations
simultaneously. Moreover, these cases would likely have been joined for trial
because of the similarity of the offenses, and I would have been officially
defending two cases in a single trial.
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blood type might have been the same as that of the real
rapist, or perhaps no blood type would have shown up. I had
an alibi for one crime, but whether there would have been an
alibi for the rape, had he been released from jail in time to
commit it, cannot be known.
Absent some exculpatory scientific evidence or an air-
tight alibi by witnesses outside his family, my guess is that
he would have been convicted despite my best efforts, and
those of more senior counsel, who would have assumed first
chair in the trial of the joined charges. And, if he had been
convicted, whether the biological evidence would have been
preserved and someday reexamined is unknowable.
A second scenario would have been less cataclysmic for
my client, but illustrative of the problems with being
comfortable that the innocent will prevail. My discovery of
the proof of innocence rested on the police noticing a possible
connection to another crime, but not recognizing that my
client was locked up at the time the crime occurred. Had
there been no other similar sexual offense committed, had the
police simply not noted the similarity between the offenses, or
had they assumed no connection because my client could not
have committed the crime, Innocent Client #1 would have
gone to trial on the single charge of assault with intent to
rape, or been faced with taking a guilty plea to avoid the
prospect of longer incarceration after a trial with an
uncertain outcome. Prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office
in Washington, D.C. operated under a principle that they
would not prosecute one-witness-eyewitness-identification
cases without some corroboration. My client's apparent
recognition of the victim would have satisfied the
corroboration requirement, and I have no reason to believe
the prosecutor would have dismissed on the basis of his
family alibi.
B. Troubling Issues Regarding Innocent Client #1
I have no doubt that many innocent men like Client #1
have spent time in prison, and some are still there today.
This young man could have spent his life in jail but for the
lineup fluke. Two issues are of prime concern to me. First, if
this case had come later in my career at PDS, after I became
more jaded, I do not know whether I would have been
[Vol:50
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impressed by the client's protestations of innocence.31
Perhaps, I would not have put a high priority on immediately
documenting the alibi. This question does not trouble me the
way others do regarding Innocent Client #2, which are
described later, because my decision to immediately record
the family alibi in written statement form apparently had
little impact on the prosecutor.
Second, in dealing with the prosecutor, I did assert my
personal belief in the defendant's innocence, and I believe
that commitment of my credibility mattered. I put my
personal reputation on the line. While I assume that I would
have done that regardless of when the case occurred in my
career, given the "looks like" identification for a crime he
could not have committed, I did it in no other case.
Did I do anything amiss in making that declaration? In
later conversations, one senior attorney worried about my
assertion of the client's innocence, because he assumed I
would not make a similar claim in my other cases, which was
a correct assumption. By expressing my personal belief in
Innocent Client #1's case, I indirectly harmed all my other
clients for whom I did not make the same statement.12  I
31. One impact of the increased concern with innocence could be that
defense lawyers today more readily focus on the possibility of innocence
(particularly in eyewitness identification cases) than attorneys did before the
DNA exonerations.
32. The concern is that when a lawyer makes a claim about believing a
client is innocent, that claim may hurt the lawyer's other clients because if a
similar claim is not made for the lawyer's other clients, it indicates that the
lawyer does not believe in their innocence. This problem is particularly acute
when the statement is made publicly to the press. See Kevin Cole & Fred C.
Zacharias, The Agony of Victory and the Ethics of Lawyer Speech, 69 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1627, 1665-66 (1996). Disciplinary rules prohibit lawyers' expression of
belief in innocence at trial, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e)
(2008), and prohibitions against pre-trial publicity have that effect in many
situations. See id. at R. 3.6(a). Although there is no ethics rule prohibition
against my private presentation to the prosecutor, and I said nothing that
directly suggested that I did not believe all my other clients to be innocent, the
problem of a potential negative impact on other clients remains. There are less
direct forms of my statement that prosecutors indicate they have encountered
more often than a direct claim of innocence that can have much the same effect.
This occurs when a well-known defense attorney asks the prosecutor to take a
careful look at the evidence in a particular case, which is the type of formulation
I used for Client Not Guilty. See infra Part III.C. This formulation is often as
much as the defender can accurately say, given my perception that innocence is
often hard to know and thus frequently appropriate for that reason. It may
lessen the harm to other clients, but that harm results whenever an individual
client's case is given special treatment based on likely innocence.
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explained my action under the general office policy that,
although we had multiple clients, we were instructed to try
each case (other than client conflicts) as if it were our only
case. Anything we did in one case might, in fact, indirectly
affect other cases. For example, declining to volunteer
information that we determined privileged, but which the
judge clearly expected to be revealed, would likely result in
the loss of the judge's trust if it later came to light. The
position the office took was to represent each person, as much
as possible, as an individual in isolation from all other cases
and wait for the damage in other cases to materialize, at
which time efforts to ameliorate the damage would be taken.
The assessment was that concern about maintaining a good
reputation would inevitably lead to tentative advocacy, which
would be more damaging to clients than the possible loss of
Professor Fred Zacharias has returned to the issue of giving special
treatment to the innocent outside of publicly made statements. See Fred C.
Zacharias, Fitting Lying to the Court into the Central Moral Tradition of
Lawyering, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 491 (2008). There he examines Professor
Monroe Freedman's hypothetical of how to respond to a judge whose routine
practice is to call defense attorneys to the bench at the beginning of trial and
ask, "Did he do it or didn't he?" Id. at 495 (citing Monroe H. Freedman, In
Praise of Overzealous Representation-Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties,
and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 773 (2006)). I do not
attempt the complex treatment Zacharias gives this type of challenge to neutral
treatment of clients. Zacharias and Freedman are concerned primarily with the
impact of the defender's answer to the known guilty and known innocent
clients. One of my major points in this article is that defense lawyers frequently
do not know that their innocent clients are innocent. Thus, it would be
dangerous not only for the guilty, but also for innocent clients, if the answer
were generally based on what the lawyer subjectively believes. Because this
communication with the judge is taking place just before the case goes to trial,
the lawyer and client have made a decision to go to trial with, presumably, a
strategy for victory that is shortly to be revealed. In the vast majority of cases, I
believe the judge should receive a convincing form of the lawyer's closing
argument as to why the client did not do it; if the lawyer has no such argument,
a claim of innocence at this point would accomplish virtually nothing of lasting
value. For me, the difficult question would come if the judge could take
definitive action, and I was convinced that my client was innocent, which was
my situation with Innocent Client #1 in meeting with the prosecutor. (I had the
combination of substantial exculpatory evidence, client conduct fully consistent
with innocence, and an explicit waiver of confidentiality.) I never encountered
my reformulation of the hypothetical in practice, but I assume I would have,
given a statement that was more than my closing argument and signaled real
innocence. Some of my reason for a different treatment is a difficulty with
justifying clear lying even founded on client loyalty. By contrast, I can defend
directly speaking the truth out of loyalty to a client if it allowed him to walk out
of the courtroom a free man and work very hard to minimize the consequences
of that action to my other clients.
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reputation.3 I fit my actions into that rubric, but I also
defended the action to myself as making the best of the
opportunities available to win the case, as I would have done
in another form for any of my other clients whether I
assumed them innocent or guilty.
C. Innocent Client #2: An Innocent "Usual Suspect" Charged
with Armed Robbery Freed in Favor of Another "Usual
Suspect"
Innocent Client #2 was charged with robbing a group of
adult males at gunpoint. He had been arrested some time
after the incident based on identification from a set of
photographs shown to the victims individually. Why he was
placed in the photo array as a suspect for this particular
crime was never made clear to me, but he had numerous
arrests and several convictions for related offenses. He was
33. Practically, the policy I described is likely to instead be something of a
compromise of positions both for an office and an individual, taking a position at
the aggressive end of a long term debate. Compare ROBERT E. KEETON, TRIAL
TACTICS AND METHODS 4 (2d ed. 1973) ("The duty of supporting the client's
cause is sometimes so forcefully stated as to support the argument that . . .a
trial lawyer [is] obliged to assert every legal claim or defense available .... But
the aim of the trial system to achieve justice, the interests of future clients, and
your legitimate interest in your own reputation and future effectiveness at the
bar compel moderation of that extreme view."), with ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE
BEST DEFENSE 405 (1982) ("Once a criminal defense lawyer begins to worry
excessively about his or her reputation for moderation ...the temptation to
sacrifice individual clients-particularly poor or despised ones-can become
overwhelming."). See also Steven Lubet, The Triage Trilemma, 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 673, 673-78 (2006) (arguing that it is untenable to say that a lawyer owes
her absolute duty only to the current client, but on the other hand
acknowledging that the failure to reveal inside knowledge of innocence for that
current client also is difficult to justify, and finding the conflict without clear
resolution).
At the individual attorney level, it might, for example, be in a particular
client's interest to act very aggressively, but not unethically, in that client's case
with respect to the prosecutor. An unexpected "sharp practice" could prove
outcome determinative. The negative consequences might be felt in all future
cases with that prosecutor, or if the conduct were notorious, with all members of
the prosecution office, significantly harming all future clients and limiting, if
not ending, the lawyer's usefulness. At the extreme, the approach is untenable
both individually and for a defenders' office. Thus, rather than a policy, it was
an approach that located allegiance to the client and vigorous defense
somewhere near the Dershowitz position. The approach was to encourage,
insofar as it is reasonably possible, an ethos of representing the individual
interests of clients; to maintain clear ethical boundaries, yet still encourage
aggressive representation; and to put client welfare ahead of personal
professional reputation.
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at least among the "usual suspects" for such a crime.
Altogether, three victims had picked his picture.
He remained in jail, unable to make the bond that had
been set. When I interviewed him at the jail shortly after my
appointment, he told me that he knew nothing at all about
this offense and that he did not know very much about why
he had been arrested beyond the little that the police had said
about multiple witnesses identifying him. At an early stage
of such cases, one always explores whether an alibi is
available. I will not go into any detail, but we talked about
where he had been at the hour of the robbery, which occurred
approximately two weeks before his arrest.
Like many of my clients, this young man was not married
and was not holding a steady job. For such individuals,
remembering what one did late on a particular night could
not be aided by established family routines or calendars of
events. With a personal life that lacks organization, clients
often have difficulty remembering accurately their
whereabouts several weeks earlier on a day that had no
special importance to them if they did not commit the crime.
He had told the police that he was elsewhere at the time
of the crime-that he had an alibi.34 His statement to the
police was among the expected standard responses: spending
the night with a girlfriend, watching television with a family
member at the critical time, or spending an evening "hanging
out" with friends. We worked on piecing together his
memory, and I followed it up with a potential corroborating
witness. I then determined whether the person he identified
believed he or she was with the defendant; if so, to compare
narratives of events; and if they coincided, to seek
corroborating detail. The first effort failed; I went back to the
client and started the process again. 5
I do not know how the effort would have turned out, but I
know based on my early efforts that I was not looking forward
to going to trial with this case. I knew that one or more
witnesses would testify on his behalf, but whether I was
working on an accurate memory of the time of the crime was
34. Because these communications were not disclosed to the prosecution, my
treatment of them is purposefully inexact.
35. Some clients realized that they had made a mistake in their statement
to the police and this started my investigative process with what might be
known in court as Alibi #2.
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not clear, and whether the defense would impress anyone was
even less clear. In short, I was having no luck developing
evidence to establish his innocence and little to support his
defense.
My innocent client's memory might have been faulty
because of the passage of time, and rather than having a
definite memory, he may have been giving the hoped for
correct answer because if he was not with the person he
named, he did not know where he was at the time of the
crime. All he knew was that he did not commit the crime. On
the other hand, I assumed he might have remembered quite
clearly where he was at that time-committing the charged
robbery. Or he might have been alone, or, since he had a
criminal record, perhaps involved in some activity, such as
drug use, that would hardly be impressive to the jury.
I knew that after my conversations with my client and
the witness(es), I had nothing that would impress a jury, and
my client was likely to be convicted if the victims/witnesses
identified him forcefully and credibly in court. He had a
felony criminal record, which under D.C. law was
automatically admissible if he testified, 36 and some of his
convictions involved both violence and robbery. In addition,
he did not have a positive personal situation or employment
history, let alone any prospect of presenting good character
evidence. Something might have developed in the way of a
convincing defense after further effort, but it was not clear to
me what it would be, and my client would likely be required
to testify, with the resulting impact of his record on the jury's
view of him. I had not yet attempted to interview the victims,
and an effective defense might have materialized there. The
prosecutor had not yet provided details about the photo array
shown to the witnesses, so I do not know whether it was
particularly suggestive, but experience had taught me that,
while there was almost always something suggestive about
the photos, suppression was very unlikely. Moreover, juries
were not overly impressed with suggestive photos as long as
witnesses were confident of their identification and plausible
in their testimony.
36. See D.C. CODE § 14-305(b)(1) (1981) (admitting all "felonies"-offenses
punishable by more than a year-and misdemeanors that involve dishonesty or
false statement for the purpose of attacking the credibility of the witness).
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To be explicit, I thought he was guilty even though later
events showed he was innocent. I began thinking about what
type of plea offer I might receive from the prosecution. At
least no one had been injured during the crime, but
apparently a real gun, with its attendant seriousness, had
been used. I believe something on the order of five years of
prison time was likely to be the minimum sentence that
would result from the prosecutor's offer and the judge's
sentence.
I was startled to receive a phone call from the Assistant
U.S. Attorney handling the case saying he was dismissing all
charges and my client would be released shortly from jail.
Why? A pure fluke he said.
He had asked the three witnesses to come to his office in
the grand jury section of the U.S. Attorney's Office for
interviews. Each came in separately and told him that they
now realized they had picked the wrong man's picture. They
almost literally confronted their mistake when they
recognized the person who actually robbed them sitting in the
large witness waiting area they had passed through. The
perpetrator was apparently a victim or a witness in another
case. The federal prosecutor was fully convinced of the
sincerity of their change of heart and had the man they now
identified placed under arrest. (I am confident that my client
was not behind this change of heart. He was without any
apparent resources or family contacts or interested friends to
influence anyone from his jail cell.)
Like Innocent Client #1, this client apparently looked like
the real culprit. Police suggestiveness may have played a role
in the selection, since police actions during photo showings
can easily give clues as to whom the officer believes should be
picked. However, I have no way to know what caused the
erroneous identifications.
D. Troubling Issues Regarding Innocent Client #2
I have several worries from Innocent Client #2's case that
I have not been able to resolve over the years. First, I had no
clue this client was innocent. Nothing about the case or the
client's behavior set off a signal that this case was different
from the mine run. Second, I think I was a first-rate trial
lawyer working in an excellent public defender office with
relatively substantial defense resources by the standards of
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public defenders. While it was early in the development of
Innocent Client #2's case, I had yet to strike upon anything
that looked like a potentially winning defense. This client
was innocent, but nothing about the case appeared different
from the standard fare of big city public defenders-a losing
case and a guilty client. My third worry has only come to me
as societal concern with innocence has increased in the wake
of DNA exonerations. I now wonder whether this client may
have been representative of a larger group of innocent clients,
some of whom I talked into pleading guilty, despite their
initial and sometimes prolonged protestations of innocence. I
would have pressed them to plead guilty because, as
compared with the reduced charges offered in the plea deal, I
assessed the prospects at trial to be poor and wanted them to
avoid the likely substantial penalty both for being convicted
of the lead counts in the indictment and for going to trial.
The first worry-that I had no inkling of innocence-is a
concrete part of my justification for not caring particularly
about whether I believed my clients were guilty. Sometimes
the defense lawyer does truly know the client is guilty, but in
a sizeable group of cases, which includes cases where the
lawyer believes he or she virtually "knows" the client is
guilty, the defense attorney will be wrong, and the client will
remarkably be innocent. If I had any thought about it, I
believed this client was likely guilty. While I would have had
no reason to be confident, I also had no personal basis to
challenge the prosecution's apparent evidence of guilt. I
clearly had no knowledge or proof of his innocence, and to say
that I had an intuition that this client was innocent would
give the inverse of my state of mind.
Why I had no such thought in this case, but did in the
earlier case, is telling and will be the subject of the next
section. In short, my surmise of guilt was substantially based
on a character inference supported by my inability to
corroborate his asserted defense (inability to prove
innocence). Based on his prior record, this client was the type
of person who committed crimes of the type charged.
Innocent Client #2's prior conviction for similar crimes is not
only the likely reason why his photo was shown to the
victims, but it is also the reason why it would have been
difficult for him to testify, thereby limiting his chances for
acquittal. I had a different reaction for Innocent Client #1 in
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substantial part because the crime did not appear to fit the
man or his prior trivial record. Fortunately, unlike Innocent
Client #1, this client would not have spent his life in prison if
convicted.
My second concern is the potentially large number of
innocent defendants whose cases produced no biological trace
evidence and therefore no potentially exculpatory DNA were
wrongly convicted. The problem may be linked to the
unfortunate fact that some innocent individuals have no
compelling defense or winning personal attributes and to
problematic types of evidence, such as eyewitness
identifications, which are frequently offered and often
incorrect. Many of these convictions will not leave definitive
trace evidence, and thus, even when erroneous, may not later
be examined or corrected.
My guess is that had it not been for the fluke exoneration
by the three witnesses, I would have had a very, very serious
discussion with this client about entering a guilty plea. Many
clients start out saying they are innocent. My response would
be a different version of "I don't care." I would tell the client
that I found it extremely unfortunate that the government
was committed to the client's guilt, but that was the
prosecutor's firm conclusion, and that despite my best efforts,
which I said would be considerable, the client was very, very
likely to be convicted and go to prison for a long time. I
suggested that being innocent would not make serving that
prison time easier. The client had to face up to the difficult
situation he was in and make a smart choice, even if it was
an unpleasant one. The client needed to think hard about
pleading guilty.37 Then we would get down to talking about
the specific evidence the government had, our potential
37. See Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying
Responsibility and its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1363-65 (2000)
(discussing the reality of plea bargaining in punishing protestations of
innocence with heavier potential sentences after trial, illustrating the dilemma
for one client who recognizes that if he admits that he did something the client
denies doing, he will be released, but if he says he did the crime, he can be
released on the basis of the generous plea offer). The best and worst defense
counsel conversations with clients about guilty pleas unfortunately share many
features. Moreover, the incentive to take the plea because of what is effectively
a penalty for going to trial is omnipresent. One key distinguishing factor
between the conversations with adequate versus inadequate counsel is how
much work and careful consideration went into the lawyer's advice on how the
prospects after trial and the punishment upon a plea compare.
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defenses, and the likely sentence he would receive if he went
to trial and was convicted versus the sentence he would
receive if he entered a guilty plea. How hard I pushed
depended on how much I judged the client stood to gain by
pleading guilty as compared with the likelihood of losing at
trial and the sentencing consequences of a loss. 3s
My third worry, which is relatively new, is that some of
those who initially resisted pleading guilty, claiming to be
innocent, but ultimately relenting, were innocent like
Innocent Client #2 .3  They may have been innocent, but I did
38. I had earned a Masters in Public Policy at Harvard and actually did
some crude risk assessment. In addition to the part of my analysis that went
according to risk assessment, I had a rule of thumb for what I saw as big
mistakes in cases that did not appear to have decent prospects at trial. If the
sentence after a plea of guilty would be more than ten years in prison, I spent
relatively little time trying to persuade a client to take the plea. But if the
difference was between a sentence under which the years served would be in the
single digits after a plea, and a much longer sentence that exceeded a decade of
imprisonment if the client went to trial, then I worked very hard to get the
client to take a guilty plea.
Professor Abbe Smith describes such a situation that occurred in her
practice. She represented a client where the plea offer in two drug distribution
cases would have resulted in three years of confinement, and she predicted that
a conviction after trial on either of two cases covered by the plea deal would in
her pre-trial estimate have garnered about thirty years. ABBE SMITH, CASE OF
A LIFETIME: A CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER'S STORY 74-75 (2008). She told the
client there was "next to no chance of winning both cases," which he wishfully
understood as meaning he "had a shot" and chose to go to trial on both cases
rather than accepting the plea offer. Id. at 75. He was convicted in the first
trial and received a sentence of twenty-seven years, and the prosecution
dismissed the other charge. Id. at 76. Smith regrets that she was not more
forceful in pushing her client to make what she assessed the logically mandated
decision. See id. at 75-76. Her sense in that case was mine; I pushed very hard
in these types of cases for what I believed was the truth and what I believed
was an unpleasant but rational decision.
Innocent Client #2's case would not have quite fit my rule-of-thumb
paradigm case because his expected sentence after trial would not have been so
high and his sentence after a plea might have approached ten years. However,
if nothing had turned up in the defense work and I had gotten a decent plea
offer, I would have pushed him rather hard to take the plea.
Since the prosecutor's office did not offer no-contest pleas, the last part of
the plea process was to work through with the client that he would have to tell
the judge he did the crime and this would have to be the truth. I do not know
whether any of my clients who pleaded guilty were innocent and had to say
something that was not true.
39. My recent recognition of the larger potential problem stems from DNA
exonerations, which have demonstrated that the innocent do plead guilty. See
Kathy Swedlow, Pleading Guilty v. Being Guilty: A Case for Broader Access to
Post-Conviction DNA Testing, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 575, 589 (2005) (noting that
among 162 DNA exonerations examined to that point, twelve involved guilty
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not believe them. At that time, I did not put their cases
together with my experience in Innocent Client #2's case, and
perhaps rightly so, because fluke exonerations are rare.
It is perhaps remarkable that this perception is relatively
new, but in other ways not so. My lack of belief in innocence
and their innocence would not matter to what I consider my
proper task if I appraised correctly the strength of the cases
that the prosecution would offer and the defense could
present. Clients, even if innocent, still made a rational choice
to plead guilty. It may be that time served by an innocent
person is more painful than the same amount of time by a
guilty person, but I do not believe being innocent helps extra
time in prison go faster, which makes a decision to go to trial
when the chances of acquittal are poor irrational, even if the
client is innocent.
II. INNOCENCE AS AN ENABLER FOR PROGRESSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE REFORM OR A "WEDGE ISSUE" WITH POTENTIAL TO
DIVIDE SUPPORTERS OF OVERALL FAIRNESS
The problem of erroneous convictions is not new, but the
societal perception of such errors has gained salience with the
public, apparently because of a group of exonerations resting
on scientific proof. Beginning in the 1990s, numerous
publicized exonerations resulted from DNA evidence. They
involved defendants who had been convicted before DNA
technology was available, but for whom biological trace
evidence remained to be tested. In particular, these
exonerations highlighted the dangers of uncorroborated
eyewitness identification evidence.4 °
My perception is that this new recognition has been a
boon to fairness concerns, and as a result, a number of
procedural reforms affecting those accused of crime have been
enacted. Concern for fair treatment is in the American
character. However, it is less of a concern to many if
pleas).
40. See, e.g., CONNORS ET AL., supra note 9, at 15 (noting that eyewitness
identifications were involved in all the twenty-eight cases studied other than
some of the homicides); JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE
GOES WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT 246, 365 (2001) (finding erroneous
eyewitness testimony involved in seventy-seven percent of the 130 exonerations
examined); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 76
(2008) (finding erroneous eyewitness testimony in seventy-nine percent of the
cases).
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procedural protections designed to ensure fair treatment are
seen as benefitting indiscriminately the largely guilty overall
defendant population more than the innocent.41
Demonstrations that clearly innocent defendants have been
tried, convicted, and imprisoned have created a degree of
receptivity to reform that I had not observed previously. As
noted earlier, concern for innocence has been an "enabler" for
procedural reforms that benefit the accused equally.
So what is the problem I perceive with a focus on
innocence? It is the promise of neatly separating the innocent
from the guilty.
The focus on innocence could negatively affect those not
perceived as likely to be innocent if reforms can be targeted in
ways that promise to have different impacts on the innocent
as compared with the guilty.42 In an environment that
focuses heavily on innocence in general, and given recent
41. In their article, Carol and Jordan Steiker note that, while unfairness to
the innocent is not unique in seriousness or importance in the criminal justice
system, publicity for injustices to the innocent have had far more impact on the
public than other types of injustices. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on
Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 587, 606 (2005). They speculate as to why this may be the public
reaction:
We fear that the power of innocence claims derives in large part from a
type of cognitive bias. Individuals tend to overestimate risks of harm
that they believe themselves to face and to underestimate risks they
view as attaching only to others. Even with our extraordinary
incarceration rates, most Americans do not view themselves as
potential criminals, and thus most Americans are unlikely to view
themselves as subject to the many risks of harm we detailed above. On
the other hand, we suspect that many Americans, whether offender or
non-offender, can imagine getting erroneously caught in the web of the
criminal justice system, even if, as a practical matter, the overall risk is
small and overwhelmingly distributed to actual offenders (the usual
suspects). This process of identification is fueled by dramatic media
accounts of the wrongfully accused and convicted and the comparative
lack of public interest in the harms inflicted upon the guilty.
Id. See also Raymond, supra note 20 (expressing concerns that the focus on
innocence may ultimately harm defendants who cannot claim that mantle).
42. Professor Daniel S. Medwed has termed the growing focus on innocence
as "innocentrism." Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549,
1549. He sets out a number of arguments that have been raised against
innocence as a focus for critiquing the criminal justice system. Id. at 1555-56.
Among these criticisms are the concerns of procedural fairness by advocates
who fear "innocentrism" may obscure more pervasive flaws. Id. at 1555-56,
1566-70. In the end, Medwed concludes that innocence and fairness provide
critiques that are largely complementary rather than conflicting. Id. at 1570.
32 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:50
suggestions that prosecutors be given new duties regarding
those likely to be innocent, 43 it may prove problematic that
relatively little new scrutiny has been given to the long-
accepted position that defense attorneys are not expected to
give different treatment to the those particularly likely to be
innocent.14 In other areas particularly, but here as well, my
fear is that innocence may become a "wedge issue," dividing
progressives concerned generally about fairness from those
principally concerned about innocence, and that innocence
will ultimately undercut support for procedural fairness
guarantees that apply to all defendants if reforms can instead
be focused more narrowly on the deserving accused-the
innocent.45
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008) (newly adopted
amendments); discussion supra note 1.
44. Professor Michael Risinger has suggested to me that attitudes toward
reforms based on concerns about innocence may usefully be divided into a
number of distinct groups. See e-mail from D. Michael Risinger, Professor of
Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, to Robert P. Mosteller, Professor of
Law, Duke University School of Law (Aug. 22, 2008) (on file with author). The
first group includes prosecutors and similar thinkers among academics who fear
that any move to protect the charged or convicted innocent better than we now
do will lead to intolerable levels of acquitting the guilty. Id. The second is
comprised of defense attorneys and academics that identify with them, whose
ideology is such that they believe that all acquittals are good whether the
defendant is in fact guilty or innocent. Id. This position is based generally on
the social benefits of controlling government abuse by putting the government
to strict proof, coupled with a commitment to the adversary system in general,
and to the goodness of any proposed reform that makes government proof more
difficult, whether correlated with innocence or not. Id. The latter position is
influenced by the fact that it makes victory at trial or in plea negotiations more
likely for them and their clients. Id. From this perspective, knowledge of a
client's factual innocence and any obligation to act differently as a result, is to
be avoided because it would signal the likely guilt of the other clients. Id. The
third group is comprised of the actual innocence adherents, who may recognize
that the costs of acquitting the guilty must be taken into account in system
reforms, but who are willing to demand system reforms based on theoretically
better ways of separating guilty from innocent, and to give up some "truth
defeating" advantages for the mine run of criminal defendants (such as parts of
the exclusionary rule and parts of the privilege against self-incrimination, etc.)
to get such reforms. Id.;D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An
Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780-82 (2007) (discussing the first and third groups briefly).
45. As I am discussing "wedge issue" and innocence, I am purposefully using
the Merriam-Webster definition, "a political issue that divides a candidate's
supporters or the members of a party." See supra note 3 and accompanying
text. This definition recognizes that some issues by their nature can divide
those who ordinarily are allies. As applied to those who are animated by a
desire to protect the innocent, I do not intend it to be used as it sometimes is to
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If the notion that innocence can be proven definitively
leads to a tendency to diminish protections that make no
claim to be able to distinguish between the guilty and the
innocent, but protect all defendants, the theoretical
commitment to providing a vigorous defense for all could
suffer. It would, indeed, be ironic if the commitment of the
profession to providing legal representation for all
defendants, explicitly including the guilty, were to be
undercut by a progressive movement that favors giving
special protection to the innocent against erroneous
conviction. I doubt that will be the outcome, but in this
article, I am attempting to examine and explain why the
position that general concern about guilt and innocence is
incompatible with defense counsel's function and why that
function is, in fact, essential to protecting many who are
innocent. 46
A. Differential Impact of Reforms Based on Innocence Versus
Differential Treatment of Defendants by Their Counsel Based
on Concern About Innocence
The impact of reforms frequently varies across
defendants, and occasionally reforms will predictably impact
the guilty and the innocent differently. Such differences do
identify its purposeful exploitation of such an issue by those in an opposition
camp. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1950 (4th ed. 2000) (defining "wedge issue" as "[a] sharply divisive political
issue, especially one that is raised by a candidate or party in hopes of attracting
or disaffecting a portion of an opponent's customary supporters"). That may be
a possible use as suggested by Professors Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe. See
Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda:
Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998)
(criticizing Professor Paul Cassell's use of the innocent to undermine Miranda
in Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions-and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998)).
However, defenders and those who seek protection of the innocent are natural
allies who may be split apart involuntarily. They are not adversaries, and
within this community, any division that might occur would be both inadvertent
and unfortunate.
46. Although hopefully unlikely, defenders can rationally fear the creation
of a wedge issue by the well-intended who care exclusively about innocence that,
in the end, diminishes respect for the defense of all and thereby hurts many
who are innocent. Hopefully, those who focus on innocence and are involved in
a noble effort to protect the innocent and who rationally and reasonably care
little for the guilty can at least understand the resistance of committed defense
counsel to trying to divide the guilty from the innocent as opposed to focusing on
ensuring fairness to all.
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not necessarily create what I have referred to as a "wedge
issue." Indeed, reforms that are broadly beneficial should be
supported even more by progressives if they assist in sorting
the innocent from the guilty more accurately.
Professor Richard A. Rosen of the University of North
Carolina School of Law was a colleague of mine at PDS. In
recent years, he has become a major figure in efforts to free
those wrongly convicted. He has advocated reforms that
differentially favor the innocent. For example, he has argued
that expanding DNA testing should be supported even if it
predictably may hurt some defendants-those who are
guilty.47  Similarly, within all defendants, including the
guilty, he has argued for reforms that favor the majority who
receive modest defense services that could result in loss of
advantages vis-&-vis the prosecution for those with excellent
representation. He argues that broader discovery should be
supported because it helps a large number of defendants,
even though reciprocal discovery provisions may harm
defendants who have particularly able counsel who can
outperform the prosecution and may lose their relative
advantage.4" In both of these situations, there are winners
and losers, but the benefits are broad, and neither rests on
the wedge argument that procedural protections must be
eliminated to help the innocent.
B. Innocence as a "Wedge Issue" in Vigorously Defending All
Those Accused of Crime
By contrast, Professor Randolph Braccialarghe developed
an argument that a focus on freeing up more defense
resources for the innocent has the potential to become a
wedge argument against vigorous defense of all, which
includes mostly the guilty, but also some who are innocent.49
He correctly notes that although the work of most criminal
defense attorneys is among those perceived to be guilty, with
a focus on successful litigation for all clients rather than
acquitting the innocent, the favorable aspect of the defender's
47. See Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237,
288.
48. Id. at 288-89.
49. See Randolph Braccialarghe, Why Were Perry Mason's Clients Always
Innocent? The Criminal Lawyer's Moral Dilemma-The Criminal Defendant
Who Tells His Lawyer He is Guilty, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 65 (2004).
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image rests on defense attorneys who help the innocent to
triumph, such as the mythical Perry Mason who consistently
represented innocent clients.50
Braccialarghe's proposal is to shift the focus to the
innocent by denying a full defense to some among the guilty.
He argues that presently, a defense counsel:
looks at his cases from the perspective of how strong the
evidence is against a client and the likelihood of securing
an acquittal. Accordingly, a criminal defense attorney's
focus is not on justice, not on securing acquittals for his
innocent clients, but on securing acquittals for his clients,
innocent or guilty. The practical result is that a criminal
defense attorney who sees that the state's case is weak
will spend his efforts attempting to get an acquittal in
that case, and, where the state has more evidence in
another case with a greater chance of getting a conviction,
the defense attorney, maximizing his own utility if not
that of his client, would be more likely to urge that client
to plead guilty.
... The result is that a defense attorney will spend
more of his time representing and attempting to get
acquittals for criminal defendants who are guilty where
the evidence against them is not as strong, and he will
spend less of his time attempting to get acquittals for
criminal defendants who are innocent where the state has
a stronger case.51
50. Id. at 65-70. He contends that "a criminal defense attorney's focus is
not on justice, not on securing acquittals for his innocent clients, but on
securing acquittals for his clients, innocent or guilty." Id. at 75.
51. Id. at 75-76. I take issue with a number of points of Braccialarghe's
analysis and observations. It might even seem clear that defense counsel who is
not focused on innocence would take to trial cases where the government's
evidence is weak for both the lawyer's personal and the client's benefit. I
explain elsewhere why plea bargaining incentives may mean that from the
client's perspective, cases with relatively weak government evidence should
result in guilty pleas. I also explain elsewhere that ethical defense counsel
makes trial decisions that support his or her client's interest.
Even assuming the lawyer's personal interest is the only one to be
considered, it is not clear that cases with weak government evidence are the
ones that will be taken to trial. It may be that lawyers as competitors always
want to win and so I cannot refute the argument that a win at trial is
preferable. However, if the interest the lawyer is concerned with is reputational
(he or she gets no direct financial benefit from a win), then I suggest that
winning easy cases is not the way to go. I believe reputation is built most on
winning either difficult (those with strong government evidence) or notorious
cases. The former is excluded by definition. Some, but not many, notorious
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Braccialarghe's solution is to bar, under a modified ethics
rule, lawyers from advancing for those guilty clients anything
other than a solely legal defense, 2 somehow to encourage
defense attorneys to secure admissions of guilt from their
guilty clients, and thereby increase guilty pleas.53 With more
guilty clients being forced into guilty pleas, the defense
attorneys would, he argues, have more time to defend the
innocent regardless of the strength of the prosecution's case.54
I find Braccialarghe's proposal, which is no doubt well-
intentioned, profoundly misguided in its potential broader
impact-an example of a wedge argument against providing a
vigorous defense of all those charged with crimes and, more
generally, a way to use innocence to undermine the perceived
worth of the work of criminal defense attorneys. However,
some of his assumptions, which I believe are incorrect,
cases that go to trial involve weak government evidence. If the lawyer is trying
to maximize income if appointed by the court and paid by the case or the hour,
or trying to minimize effort, it is unclear that cases with weak government
evidence will be taken to trial rather than pleaded by a lawyer who is not
concerned with his or her clients' interest.
52. He proposes a change in ethics rules that would mean criminal defense
attorneys would face sanctions, like civil attorneys, for defending clearly non-
meritorious cases, specifically arguing for a change to MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008) to remove the allowance for criminal defense attorneys
to require every element of the offense to be proven, even if the attorney lacks a
non-frivolous basis in fact. Braccialarghe, supra note 49, at 72. Others can
speak to the merits of the proposed change rather than its potential to develop
as a wedge, but my reaction is that, given the unfortunately tepid vigor of many
of those who represent the indigent, threatening disciplinary action against
defenders for contesting issues hardly seems an appropriate "reform."
Braccialarghe focuses, in particular, on defendants who confess their guilt
to their attorney. He would limit defense efforts in such cases to a plea of
guilty, the presentation of defense based on legal argument alone, and
mitigation at sentencing. Id. at 72, 77, 79.
53. Braccialarghe does not explain precisely why, but he appears to assume
that defense attorneys will work to obtain not only accurate information, but
also admissions of guilt from their clients. See id. at 79 (suggesting that defense
attorneys would confront defendants about apparent incriminating facts during
case preparation and some number of clients would "confess their guilt").
Perhaps all he is assuming is that currently, confessions are frequently made by
defendants to their attorneys. If so, he does not explain why knowledgeable
clients would continue to confide in their lawyer that they are guilty after his
ethics rule revision or why lawyers would seek or obtain as many and
apparently more confessions after the change. Perhaps he is assuming that the
threat of sanction for defending non-meritorious cases would prod the self-
interested in marginally defensible cases with ambiguous declarations by their
clients to encourage clarifying admissions.
54. Id. at 78-80.
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highlight points that deserve careful attention. First,
Braccialarghe ignores the impact of his change in the rule on
future defendant behavior. Under his system, the lawyer
would be prohibited from mounting a defense challenging
factual guilt if he or she knows the client is guilty,5 and such
knowledge appears to be solely defined as the defendant
admitting guilt to his own lawyer.56
If this change in ethics rules were enacted, why would
any knowledgeable client admit guilt to his or her attorney? I
believe none but the uninformed or gullible would. Indeed,
my experience with hundreds of clients is that the situation is
not much different than that currently. Most of my clients,
and the vast majority of my clients charged with serious
offenses, did not admit guilt. I asked for, and they gave me,
detailed accounts, some of which turned out to be truthful,
some untruthful, some of which were helpful in developing a
defense, and some damaging. These factual statements were
accompanied by the summary contention, explicit or implicit,
that "I am innocent." The defendant's story might change,
but the explanation was that the previous version had been
inaccurate or false and the new one accurate and true.
I came to believe my mentor was correct-defendants
could not actually believe they would get the same
representation if their lawyer believed they were guilty. The
statements of my clients sometimes pushed me in the
direction of concluding they were guilty when evaluated
against other information I had assembled, but that was my
conclusion, not their admission. I had trouble seeing my
assessments of my client's sometimes inconsistent and,
arguably, implausible statements as having greater probative
55. Id. at 74.
56. Id. at 78.
57. Braccialarghe argues that guilty clients who admit guilt get an
advantage over those who deny guilt to their lawyers presently because the
lawyer in the latter case is better able to meet the government's case.
Braccialarghe, supra note 49, at 86. He fails to note that many, many facts can
be shared while the client denies guilt. Perhaps what he is saying is that under
the modified rule he is advocating that punishes the lawyer for presenting
clearly non-meritorious cases, the client need not unequivocally admit guilt to
be denied a full defense, only that the client must admit some facts that the
lawyer concludes proves guilt. Cf. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 171-72
(1986) (accepting that a client's earlier inconsistent and incriminating version of
events sufficiently established that the subsequent version would constitute
perjury).
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value than strong government evidence, such as my client's
signed confession, which he disavowed, or the statement of a
government witness, whom I or my investigator interviewed
and found credible. My summary is that the category of
easily secured confessions by clients in serious cases to their
lawyers is small, and it would become vanishingly small if
defendants were to learn that their lawyer "threw in the
towel" upon receiving the information.
Moreover, it appears to me that Braccialarghe's proposal
might reduce, rather than increase, guilty pleas. In our
system, defendants cannot be forced to plead guilty. The
defense counsel plays a key role in a necessary step of the
process-convincing the client that the plea is the right
outcome for the case. Here, as elsewhere, defense counsel
focuses directly not on guilt or innocence, but on what
Braccialarghe criticizes-what can be proven. For most of my
clients, guilt was never acknowledged until after I convinced
the client that the evidence would likely convict them."8 My
experience, and that of PDS, is that a lawyer won the
confidence of the client in his or her judgment by
demonstrating an allegiance to the client's case and a respect
for his confidences before we began the difficult process of
securing his agreement to plead guilty and acknowledgement
of guilt. I obviously cannot know what effect would be had by
changing the system to one in which any acknowledgement of
guilt led to a sudden reduction in the lawyer's role, but it
could well lead to more trials because the client cannot afford
to candidly discuss the case before deciding to accept the
unpleasant result of voluntarily convicting himself.
Braccialarghe's most useful insight is to focus attention
on the allocation of defense resources across the defense
58. Professor Abbe Smith perceptively notes that despite the criticism that
defense counsel receive for their general unconcern with truth, they actually
focus very directly on the unpleasant truth in most cases when they confront
their clients during sessions that lead to entry of guilty pleas. SMITH, supra
note 38, at 74. She states:
These sessions can be hard going, often more challenging than going to
trial. The most difficult part is telling our clients the truth about their
cases and about their lives. We do so even though the truth is often
unpleasant and may not endear us to our clients. We struggle with the
temptation to soften the blow and allow for more possibilities than
truly exist, but we know that we owe our clients the whole truth.
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attorney's case load.59 He does not look specifically at public
defenders, but his treatment of the decision process, while in
my experience inaccurate in its specifics, usefully highlights
the tradeoffs that must be made and should be acknowledged
when a lawyer represents substantial numbers of clients. As
quoted above, he asserts that defense lawyers spend their
time taking cases to trial that are the weakest government
cases, and, in that process, the defense attorney maximizes
his own utility and not that of the client. 60  As I develop in
Part IV, the allocation of defense attorney effort, because not
controlled roughly by the client through payment of a fee,
presents many potential conflicts, but is for most defenders
not at all, as Braccialarghe contends. 1
In concluding this Part, I return to the key element of the
idea undergirding Braccialarghe's proposal with which I take
strong issue: that there is some effective way to isolate either
the guilty or the innocent and apply superior procedures to
determine guilt. The same core idea animates another
scholar's proposal to create a plea of innocence that leads to
separate truth and innocence procedures.2
59. Braccialarghe, supra note 49, at 79-80.
60. See supra text accompanying note 51.
61. Elsewhere Braccialarghe reveals his low opinion of the mission of
defense attorneys, characterizing them as "part of a game" rather than "a
search for justice and truth," and, more pointedly, arguing that among those
who would be harmed by his proposals are "lawyers who benefit ... psychically
from acquittal of the guilty." See Braccialarghe, supra note 49, at 80, 85-86.
As my typology, which is described in Part V.A, recognizes, defense
attorney advocates also recognize the motivational value of the competition or
game. I know of many attorneys who do take pride in winning a difficult case,
and difficult cases often involve guilty clients-indeed, clearly guilty clients. On
the other hand, I personally have known of none who took pride or received
psychic benefit from helping a person they thought was guilty win his case.
Thus, I do not question the amorality of rewards from winning strong
government cases; I do dispute defense lawyers' immorality. Braccialarghe's
reference to "lawyers who benefit . . . psychically from acquittal of the guilty"
seems to allege that defenders take pleasure from the fact that they have
secured the release of the guilty because they are guilty rather than winning or
winning the case for their client with whom they have formed a personal
relationship. See id. at 85-86.
In his quotation, Braccialarghe also includes defense lawyers who benefit
"monetarily" from the acquittal of the guilty. Id. at 85. I do not doubt that
there are lawyers who do benefit monetarily from acquittals of the guilty. For
example, wealthy drug dealers are wealthy because of their crime, and some
attorneys benefit from successful representation of these guilty clients. My
entire focus is on those who work for the indigent.
62. See Tim Bakken, Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent
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I do not fault the idealism of those who seek these
targeted results.63 My concern remains, however, that such
sorting is not practically possible, and that implicitly there is
a failure to recognize in them the practical impossibility of
knowing and definitively proving innocence for a sizeable
number of those who are guilty. Damage will not be done by
innovative thinking. But damage can be done if the idea that
the innocent can be sorted results in undercutting support for
vigorous representation for all, which obviously will include
many who are guilty. The problem of knowing when
innocence is present will, I believe, remain and I hope will be
recognized as a major residual problem after all the sorting of
the innocent from the guilty has been accomplished by
technological advances, innovative thought, and alternative
procedures.
III. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS ACTUALLY CANNOT ALWAYS TELL
THE INNOCENT FROM THE GUILTY
A. The Central Uncertainty of What Constitutes Knowledge of
Innocence
In meeting hundreds of clients and examining their
cases, attentive defense attorneys build a knowledge base,
which enables most to analyze criminal cases with skill and
judgment. One also develops a cynical side and sees the
world as a hard place. Optimists-those who believe in the
possibility of human perfection and consider most of their
clients innocent or perfectible-do not survive long. Although
Persons: Beyond the Adversarial System, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 547 (2008);
cf. Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 120-29 (2009) (arguing that submitting to
interrogation in the current system theoretically provides useful signaling
information on innocence that should affect the discount given for pleading
guilty and that additional defendant investigational cooperation might be
utilized for further signaling).
63. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed
Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L.
REV. 1281, 1311 (2004) (arguing to create a specialized procedure under which a
defendant isolates for careful adjudication one or two factual issues to
determine innocence); George C. Thomas III, "Truth Machines" and Confessions
Law in the Year 2046, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215, 226-31 (2007) (imagining a
truth machine that reveals who among those charged with crime are guilty that
would permit the concentration of effort if not the admission of the machine
results).
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I rationally understood that I could not actually know which
clients were the innocent ones, I now recognize that I had a
false sense of confidence that I would have a relatively
accurate inclination of innocence, which I suspect many
defenders share. My suspicion is that this false confidence
arose from a self-protective instinct designed to lower the
pressure of the work, which was much easier if the system's
expectation that all clients were guilty was true.
I do not assume that many of my clients were innocent,
but what I have come to appreciate more over time is that I
could not tell the innocent from the large percentage that
were guilty. This point may be criticized because I have no
proof that I had any other innocent client beyond those who
were discovered. I do not know. However, the lack of
discernable distinction between Innocent Client #2 and many
other clients tells me that I cannot know who among a
relatively large class of other clients was innocent.
B. The Special Problem for Innocent Clients Who Lack
Overall Innocence
Before I consider directly the question of whether
subjective belief in innocence can matter, I want to note one
particularly problematic area. In a recent article about Lee
Wayne Hunt, whom I believe is an innocent man imprisoned
in North Carolina for over two decades and facing
incarceration for the rest of his life for a double murder he did
not commit, I focus on the difficulty he faced because he was
among the "usual suspects."' Assuming he was innocent of
the murders, he was clearly no stranger to crime-not an
innocent. He was convicted wholly on the basis of informant
testimony. The dangers of informant testimony are greatest
for those who have some general involvement in crime.
Because of prior criminal involvement, the accused may be
among the "usual suspects" or may be the principal target.
Such prior criminal involvement also provides foundation
facts for incriminating accusations against a plausible
suspect by informants interested in providing testimony
64. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the
Innocent Who Are Not Innocents: Producing "First Drafts," Recording Incentives,
and Taking a Fresh Look at the Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 557
(2009).
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judged valuable by the prosecution. 65
Such individuals are more likely to be identified because
they are placed in lineups or their photos are routinely shown
to victims of roughly similar crimes. My assumption is that
Innocent Client #2 was accused because he resembled the
robber and had a prior record of such crime, which put his
photo in the array shown to the victims. Professor John
Blume has written that such individuals, even if innocent, are
less likely to testify because of their prior records.6  Professor
Josh Bowers has argued that the innocent among this group
suffers a host of disadvantages within the criminal justice
system. Professor Michael Risinger contends that the public
likely cares less about innocence within this group if it
perceives that the person, although innocent in the case at
hand, has committed other crimes. 6  His intuition is that
significant concern with innocence only applies to this group
if the present charged crime is disproportionate in severity to
those the suspect is assumed to have previously committed.69
In this article, I am adding to the picture of disadvantage
the fact that such individuals are also less likely to be
believed to be innocent by their own appointed defense
counsel. This is the type of prejudice that Canon 5 sought to
65. Id. at 552.
66. See John H. Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a
Prior Record-Lessons from the Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 477 (2008) (arguing that the threat of impeachment with their prior
convictions, which are frequently available for this type of defendant, frequently
causes such defendants not to testify and contributes to their wrongful
convictions).
67. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117,
1124-32 (2008) (contending that arrest bias, charging bias, dismissal aversion,
and trial biases against the "usual suspects" are far more likely to produce
convictions among those with substantial contacts with law enforcement than
among those that are strangers to criminal conduct). Professor Bowers posits
that "[flor the typical innocent defendant in the typical case-which . . . is a
recidivist facing petty charges-the best resolution is generally a quick plea in
exchange for a light, bargained for sentence." Id. at 1119-20. I strongly agree
with Bowers' picture of the particular problems of innocent recidivists and
argue that the guilty plea option should often be chosen even for more serious
cases.
68. See Risinger, supra note 44, at 792-94; see also Bandes, supra note 2, at
9-10 (arguing that the public, exacerbated by the press's preference for
simplicity and disdain for ambiguity, supports a view of the innocent accused as
morally and factually blameless that fits poorly those with other criminal
involvement).
69. See Risinger, supra note 44, at 792-94.
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avoid by approving representation despite lack of belief in the
innocence of the person accused. I can attest that even
seasoned defense attorneys are not immune from using
character evidence in the form of a prior record for similar
offenses to infer guilt. Such thinking is common among
ordinary humans because it is one of the ways we simplify
into manageable tasks the complications of daily life and cope
with the costs and difficulties of obtaining information.
Nevertheless, to the degree that defense attorneys act on
their subjective beliefs and treat those believed to be guilty-
more likely those who have committed crimes before-in an
unfavorable way, the "usual suspects" among the attorney's
clients will be shortchanged.
C. The Difficulty of Distinguishing Innocence from Being Not
Guilty
I also believe there is another level of uncertainty that a
defense attorney faces, which I illustrate by the story of
another client, whom I call Client Not Guilty. Sometimes, as
in the case I am about to discuss, powerful evidence exists
that shows the government's case or its key witness is badly
in error. That evidence may show the client's innocence, or it
may rather show the inability of the government to
successfully prosecute. For those who care about innocence,
this distinction can be very important. Defense attorneys
who concentrate on provable guilt do not draw such
distinctions, but it is an important additional dimension to
the difficulty of knowing when a client is innocent-typically
counsel only has contestable evidence showing a likelihood of
innocence.
Client Not Guilty was charged with rape. His story to
the police, which never varied, was that he and the victim
had sex, but it was consensual. He explained that they then
had a heated argument after which she summoned the police.
He gave the police officer who arrested him the same account.
It was not credited by the police.
The evidence that led to the dismissal was the
observation of a next door neighbor. The client told me that
he had learned that this neighbor had seen him with the
complaining witness together sitting and talking before they
went inside his apartment where they had sex. The victim's
version of the events to the police excluded any possibility of
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that congenial conversation taking place.
I went to the apartment of the neighbor, a woman I
judged to be in her sixties, and asked her to tell me what she
knew. She stood at her window and described in great detail
what she witnessed, which diametrically opposed not only the
point that the client related, but substantial additional parts
of the victim's story. She was completely convincing to me
and I could discern no bias toward or connection with my
client.
I carried her information to the prosecutor, asking him to
send the detectives assigned to the case to speak with her and
inviting him to speak to her personally. I made no claim to
him to know what had happened inside the apartment, but it
was clear to me, as I suggested it would be to anyone who
spoke to this lady and to any jury, that the complaining
witness's version of events both leading up to the alleged rape
and otherwise was false. The prosecutor subsequently called
me and said he was dismissing the charges. He did not tell
me whether he concluded that my client was innocent, that
his case was untenable, or that he simply was unsure of guilt.
I do not know that this client was innocent, but the
neighbor's evidence leads me to strongly suspect it. On the
other hand, true victims may lie about parts of the event
because they believe it puts them in a bad light. Moreover,
the client did have a prior criminal record, although it
included no sexual offenses.
Is this a case of innocence? As I have stated, I do not
know. For those who care principally or exclusively about
innocence, I wonder how it should be categorized.
IV. THE ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE RESOURCES AMONG
CLIENTS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECIAL ATTENTION FOR
THE POTENTIALLY INNOCENT
Because the client does not pay a fee and hire the
attorney, a particularly complicated conflict of interest often
exists between the lawyers for indigent clients and the clients
themselves regarding the amount of effort to be expended on
the case.70 I begin with one dimension of that conflict. Public
70. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent
Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and
Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74-79
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defenders receive the same salary whether they try a case or
their client enters a plea of guilty, and with a guilty plea,
their leisure time should increase. Assuming that at least
short run handling of one's case load is all that is required to
receive full pay, public defenders have an incentive to have
their clients enter guilty pleas even if the client's interest is to
go to trial.
Appointed lawyers in some jurisdictions may have
roughly the opposite economic incentive-to go to trial rather
than to encourage their client to enter a guilty plea and to
invest little out-of-court time in preparation.71  I have
observed that for the same input of lawyer's time, trials with
minimal effort receive higher remuneration than, for
example, guilty pleas after careful preparation and
assessment. Under the compensation systems with which I
am familiar, hours spent in court have a higher hourly rate
than out-of-court time, and claims for in-court hours are
almost never rejected or reduced. Not only is the hourly rate
lower for out-of-court work, but judges are more likely to
question and disallow some of the out-of court hours claimed.
In jurisdictions with fee caps for appointed attorneys, the
incentive on whether to go to trial with limited investigation,
or convince the client to plead guilty with perhaps even more
limited investigation, would depend on how lengthy the trial
might be and how much space under the cap remained in the
particular case.
Both public defenders and court-appointed defense
counsel must be vigilant not to let their own interests in
maintaining some leisure time or in remuneration interfere
with their best judgment on the defendant's decision whether
(1993) (noting that even in the best of circumstances the relationship between
defendants and their counsel involve serious agency problems, but arguing the
conflicts of interest are particularly persistent for indigents because the lawyer
must be paid by someone other than the client); Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 242, 251-57 (1997) (arguing that one of the fundamental
difficulties with indigent defense is that of conflicting performance incentives
and that, when clients bear the cost of litigation, a plausible level of rationality
exists that is absent when the government pays defense counsel).
71. Professor Bowers recognizes this same problem although he attributes it
to "bad lawyers" not associated with any particular funding system. See
Bowers, supra note 67, at 1150 (arguing that defense attorneys who favor work
avoidance over the client's best interests are more likely to hurt their clients at
trial rather than through plea bargaining).
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to enter a guilty plea or go to trial. The major point is that
there are temptations that result from the fact that the client
is not paying the lawyer.2
As I acknowledge in a typology of defense motivations in
Part V, the thrill of prevailing in competition, which is
manifest by winning at trial, is one of the ways defense
attorneys support themselves in their work. Differently
stated, there are reputational benefits from wining trials, so
no doubt some defenders take some cases to trial because
they anticipate victory. Thus, personal reward for the lawyer
rather than the client's best interest might send a weak
government case to trial. However, my experience is that at a
conscious level, public defenders do examine their judgments
to try to keep personal interests from driving case decisions.
They make such decisions not to maximize their own
utility, but to maximize total client utility. Admittedly, they
do not maximize each client's utility. The lawyer must
develop some proxies because the client is paying nothing and
therefore cannot insist on fair work for fair pay. Inversely,
because clients are paying nothing, their utility would be
maximized as to the public defender or appointed lawyer only
if the lawyer worked full time on each client's case. Because
the client does not pay, he or she is not constrained in
wanting more defense effort by its financial cost, which would
otherwise be required to compete with other consumption
decisions. Instead of a payment scheme allocating resources,
the lawyer is required to allocate the scarce resource of her
time among clients. I believe it is roughly done by most
lawyers as if the clients were rationally allocating their own
funds among competing consumption decisions.
A. Allocation Principles-Equality of Productive Effort in the
Context of Anticipated Punishment
If allocated as described above, that allocation is roughly
72. Even if the client is paying, the relationship between expenditure of
effort and innocence will not necessarily bear any correlation. However, one
level of problems-those associated with the principal agent relationship-are
reduced, if not, eliminated. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a
Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983) (noting that "[clonflicts of
interest (agency costs)" between clients and lawyers are troubling throughout
the criminal justice process, but spending little time analyzing different funding
arrangements).
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the same as would be obtained if all clients had the same
amount of money and had an equal aversion to incarceration.
I practiced in an excellent public defender office with
relatively generous funding, and as a result, I carried a
heavy, but manageable, case load of thirty-five active cases. I
believed the lawyers at PDS provided the rough quality of
representation that middle-class clients would have
purchased for themselves. Attorneys roughly allocated their
efforts and resources according to the punishment anticipated
and the perceived productivity of the work available to be
done on the case.
The most immediate consequence is that lawyers spent
less time on a misdemeanor than a felony and more work on a
serious felony than a lower-grade felony. This allocation of
effort was reinforced by the natural result of the police effort
in most cases. By the nature of police priorities, issues of
proof were typically simpler in misdemeanor than in felony
cases. Therefore, defense efforts to investigate and counter
the proof would tend to be less in a misdemeanor than a
felony case even if it were not rationed according to the
punishment anticipated. By this, I mean that the police
spend less time investigating minor offenses. As a result,
most misdemeanor cases are solved almost immediately by an
arrest, or not at all. Such cases are usually cut and dried and
require and permit little investigation. By contrast, most
police departments will continue working to solve a homicide
case until they have exhausted their leads, and even then, it
may be re-examined from time to time under "cold case"
reviews. Some homicide cases are solved immediately, but
many are solved only after extensive investigation. That
investigation often produces complicated evidentiary links,
esoteric forensic evidence, and challengeable government
efforts, such as incentives offered to informants, which can be
investigated by the defense and may be the subject of defense
evidence.
A middle-class defendant should spend a substantial
amount on the defense of any criminal charge, but the
amount should vary according to the length of the prison
sentence anticipated from a conviction.73 Perhaps a person
73. For a serious felony, I would assume most middle-class defendants
would, if necessary, borrow substantial sums to secure a skilled lawyer with
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would invest fewer of his or her funds if he or she were guilty,
but I suspect most individuals would care about the period of
incarceration faced roughly equally, whether innocent or
guilty. At PDS, we had articulated nothing at this level of
theory, but I believe the lawyers acted as if all defendants
had an equal aversion to incarceration.
The next controlling factor in the allocation of time is the
usefulness of additional defense work. In all cases, a
modicum of discovery and/or investigation should be done so
that at least gross defects in the government's case would be
found. Similarly, regardless of the seriousness of the case, a
lawyer should check out a promising lead, such as an alibi. I
believe defenders who have a reasonable amount of resources
continue defense preparation, absent some specific time
constraint, as long as their conclusion is that it could have a
significant impact on the outcome of the case. However, at
some point, the defender may decide that the next step,
although potentially helpful, has too little likelihood of
success to be pursued-the marginal utility is too small.
Lawyers operating with limited resources should reach this
point sooner in non-serious cases than in serious ones. For
example, in every case, the defense could conduct a canvas of
the crime neighborhood to try to find witnesses not discovered
by the police or send an investigator to the location of a crime
committed in a public place at the same time of day that it
occurred to ask passersby whether they witnessed the crime.
One might do such investigation if one had infinite resources
in any case. The reality is that a public defender might
undertake such activity in a homicide case,74 but a public
defender would not conduct a neighborhood canvas in a
misdemeanor assault case or even the typical armed robbery.
I suggest that if the cost of the effort were included in the
sufficient time and defense services to mount a vigorous defense. By contrast,
the same client would not likely mortgage the family's future to avoid a
misdemeanor conviction. I am assuming clients had the same prior criminal
records as they did, which contained far more convictions and arrests than
would be true for most middle-class individuals. The threat of embarrassment
and reputation impact of even a misdemeanor conviction for someone with no
criminal record might cause a middle-class defendant to spend a large sum
avoiding conviction, which is a motivation I do not put into my calculus.
74. I found that canvasses in homicide cases sometimes turned up witnesses
who saw events somewhat differently than the witnesses found by the police,
and frequently these witnesses were extraordinarily helpful to the defense.
Other times, new incriminating witnesses were located.
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calculus, the rationing system of public defenders produces
defense effort that would resemble the effort that middle-
class clients would rationally secure for themselves through
the payment of legal fees. The system maximizes the utility
of the group of clients within the attorney's case load, or at
least it is designed to do so. It is not designed to maximize
the utility of the attorney.
The allocation is primarily made because public
defenders most basically represent our clients as individuals
worthy of dignity and respect. The lawyers may do whatever
they do in total for the cause of justice, but they accomplish
justice one client at a time and focus on the welfare of the
individual rather than the cause. Defenders do the best for
all comers, innocent or guilty, and they try to help all clients,
whatever "help" may mean.
Under the allocation system I describe, many of the cases
involving innocent clients should naturally call forth more
effort than those of guilty individuals. This is because cases
of innocent clients would often provide more opportunities for
productive work. A further general condition for extra effort
to be allocated would be that the defenders' office must be
adequately funded. The defense attorney must have the time
and the resources to pursue reasonable, but non-obvious,
leads. Presumably, if the flaws in the government's case were
easy to discern and/or the evidence of innocence obvious and
clearly available, the erroneous charges would never have
been brought. Thus, the defender must not be so over-worked
and under supported that she cannot manage to explore even
promising possibilities of innocence.
However, I do not want to claim that the allocation
system that I describe will produce extra effort for the
innocent. For example, a client like Innocent Client #2 may
simply have had no alibi because he was alone at the time of
the crime, and no amount of effort will produce a non-existent
witness. Examining the government's case may be equally
unproductive if the true perpetrator simply looks like the
defendant, the witnesses are unwilling to be interviewed, and
the police conduct was reasonably fair in putting together a
non-suggestive identification procedure that resulted in an
incorrect selection. By contrast, productive work may be
clearly available for guilty clients. For example, a motion to
suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment's
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exclusionary rule may promise dismissal of the case if
successful and provide opportunities for both productive fact
investigation and legal research, even though the client is
clearly guilty.7
5
Defenders do not consciously discriminate between
clients based on client characteristics, and I believe it is
absolutely necessary that they do not discriminate against a
client because of their personal assessment that the client is
guilty. That is the most profoundly misguided element of
Braccialarghe's revision. He wants defense attorneys to
attempt to determine which of their clients is guilty and to do
it by securing admissions of guilt from the client.76
I reject Braccialarghe's argument that public defenders
generally go to trial to maximize their own utility." I do not
doubt that the practice occurs, but I believe that most
defenders, particularly those who are ethically aware,
recommend going to trial or taking a plea based on their
assessment of what is most likely the best course of action for
the client based on the goal of maximizing liberty and
minimizing imprisonment. As Braccialarghe suggests, cases
75. The allocation system that I describe here differs dramatically on this
feature from the one advocated by Professor Darryl K. Brown. One of his
principles is in rough accord with what I observed, which is to spend greater
effort for clients with the most at stake. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing
Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from Institutional Design, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 801, 818 (2004) [hereinafter Brown, Institutional Design].
Another is not. He would not allocate resources to cases based on the likelihood
of litigation success, such as success in excluding evidence, but based on the
likelihood of factual innocence based on clues from DNA exonerations. See id.
at 816; see also id. at 808, 826-28; Darryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion
to Ration Services and Shortchange Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L. J. 207 (2003-
2004) (suggesting similar criteria for rationing defender services, which is
inevitably done and done poorly because done covertly).
One of the key elements of defender work is representing clients. I would
find it very difficult to be a defender and justify failure to perform highly
productive, ethical work for a client, such as a motion to suppress illegally
obtained evidence, because the client is guilty. On the other hand, looking for
evidence of innocence based on clues from empirical evidence in the DNA
exonerations may simply be smart lawyering and is consistent with my
observation that many times, the cases of innocent clients will provide areas for
fruitful work. Defenders do and, I believe, are well advised to look for what
they can prove regarding innocence rather than what they believe. More
significantly, I fear that the suggestion that we can triage inadequate overall
defense resources to concentrate effectively on likely innocent clients presents a
threat even to the support defenders enjoy today.
76. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
77. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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where the government's evidence of guilt is weak are more
likely to be taken to trial and those cases where the evidence
is strong are more likely to end in guilty pleas. This pattern
also likely correlates with trials for the innocent and guilty
pleas for the guilty.
However, defense counsel, if acting ethically and
intelligently, helps the client assess risk and likely outcomes.
If the government's case is weak, but still one that it will not
dismiss, the defense counsel should help the client assess the
risk of conviction at trial, evaluate the likely sentence upon
conviction, and compare that prediction with the
government's plea offer. The prosecution often makes more
generous plea offers in weak cases, and it was frequently my
experience that some of the toughest decisions occurred
where there was a considerable chance of acquittal, but the
sentence, perhaps because of a mandatory minimum, would
be quite high upon conviction. For example, a person who
was arguably a marginal aider and abettor in a homicide
might face a mandatory twenty years in prison if convicted of
first-degree murder along with the active perpetrators.
Although the prosecutor may refuse to dismiss, she may give
a plea offer of manslaughter and, given a previously clean
record, the client might face only a relatively short expected
sentence of three years or so in prison.
I encouraged guilty pleas in relatively weak government
cases, such as the marginally involved defendant in a first-
degree murder, where the certainty of limited incarceration
under the plea offer was better than I assessed the expected
value of incarceration after a trial, roughly multiplying the
percentage chance of conviction at trial by the anticipated
sentence upon conviction. By contrast, I had no ethical
alternative other than expending the tremendous time and
energy of going to trial even when the prospects at trial were
poor, but the plea offer guaranteed a lengthy prison sentence
and my client wanted to pursue his constitutional right to
trial by jury. I pushed hardest for the client to take the plea
offer, not necessarily in the strongest government cases, but
in the cases where the client was being most irrational in
terms of his, not my, utility."8 I spent the least effort on cases
78. Professor Abbe Smith describes just such a situation that occurred in
her practice. See SMITH, supra note 38, at 75-76. Her client turned down a
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where the prosecutor offered a generous plea with a short
deadline for accepting or rejecting the offer (often expiring at
the scheduled date for the preliminary hearing which was
only a week or so after the client's arrest) on a relatively
minor felony to a defendant with little or no criminal record.
In the effort of the defense attorney to allocate time and
resources properly and in advising clients whether to accept
guilty pleas or go to trial, the assessment of something close
to guilt is constantly on the defense lawyer's mind. However,
the defender is not determining whether he or she believes
the client is guilty. The defender is assessing the likelihood
the client will be proven guilty. The system becomes
dangerously pernicious, I believe, if the lawyer's belief in guilt
is allowed to enter the calculation to limit effort. Again, my
perception is not new; however, whether it remains valid in a
world where innocence is now frequently the focus of
discussion, it is important to re-examine, and if correct,
re-affirm. As developed in the following sections, my
reexamination convinces me that my long-accepted position is
both sound and almost necessary.
B. The Incompatibility of Subjective Disbelief of the Client
with Defending All Those Accused of Crime
I suggest examining some simple arrays of assessments
of guilt that will help illustrate the incompatibility of
defender assessments of guilt and vigorous advocacy for all
those who may be innocent. The contemporary focus on
innocence drives that element of the defense attorney's
potential roles to the forefront, and it is quickly obvious that
an attorney's focus on whether he or she believes the client is
guilty would be particularly damaging to those whose
innocence is difficult to discern.
The major components that might go into a defense
counsel's assessments of guilt are (1) the defense attorney's
plea offer that would have resulted in a few years in prison in favor of going to
trial on two strong cases with a conviction in either resulting, she predicted, in a
sentence of roughly thirty years in prison. Id. at 75. The client was convicted in
the first trial and received a sentence close to her prediction. Id. She
acknowledges her continued regret at not having been more forceful in
convincing the client to take the plea offer. Id. Her sense in that case is in
accord with mine. I pushed very, very hard in these types of cases for what I
assumed was the truth and what I knew was an unpleasant but rational
decision.
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objective assessment of the strength of the government's
evidence and her objective assessment of the strength of the
defense evidence, and (2) the defense attorney's subjective
assessment of the client's guilt or innocence. Statements by
the client to the lawyer always have an impact on the
attorney's subjective assessment. Information by the client
can add to or limit the defense evidence in that the client can
be a witness and identify potential defense evidence or her
admissions can eliminate the client as a potential witness. I
include the defendant's information within the defense
attorney's objective assessment of the evidence. Direct and
indirect admissions of guilt go there as well. However, my
experience is that defendants explicitly only deny guilt in
serious cases, and such protestations of innocence and other
factors go into the defense attorney's subjective evaluation of
guilt and particularly innocence.
With the primary dimension on the horizontal axis of the
objective strength of the objective evidence, I array defense
counsel's assessment of guilt or innocence in a series of
situations. Moving from left to right goes from strong
objective evidence of guilt to strong evidence of innocence. It
begins with a rational assessment of this evidence by the
defense attorney. Moving down the chart brings in the
subjective evaluations based on reactions to the client by
defense attorneys. Next, the same rational lawyer reacts to
protestations of innocence by a persuasive client. Finally,
this lawyer assesses the case for an unpersuasive client.
I believe the chart helps visualize the problems that
would arise if defense counsel frequently let their personal
assessments of guilt or innocence affect the level of the effort.
I begin by recognizing the important point that while
innocence will more likely be found toward the right side of
the chart, cases at any position on the chart may involve
innocent clients. Thus, any reduction in defense effort based
on reactions to the evidence or the client is problematic not
only for those who champion procedural protections, but
because it can result in the innocent being convicted. Thus,
anytime uncertainty or belief in guilt is listed in the last
three rows as the lawyer's reaction, there is a potential
problem if it results in diminished effort, and if innocence
appears and produces greater efforts, it threatens to sap other
clients of an adequate defense, particularly if it appears
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frequently.
Table 1. The effect of objective evidence on a defense attorney's perception of a
client's guilt or innocence.
Strenth of Objective Evidence of Guilt
Extremely Clear &
Strong Strong Middling Weak Convincing
Evidence of Evidence of Evidence of Evidence of Evidence of
Guilt Guilt Guilt Guilt Innocence
Defendant's Deny Deny Deny Deny Deny
Statement to (Perhaps
Defense Counsel Admit)
Typical Rational Guilty Guilty Uncertain Uncertain/ Innocent
Assessment by (Guilty) Innocent
Defense Attorney
Subjective Uncertain Innocent Innocent Innocent Innocent
Assessment with (Guilty)
Persuasive
Client
Subjective Guilty Guilty Guilty/ Uncertain Uncertain/
Assessment with (Guilty) Uncertain Innocent
Unpersuasive
Client
If the focus is on innocence, generally the possibility of
defender assessment resulting in unjust convictions is less
worrisome at the far left and far right of the chart. This is
because these situations tend largely to take care of
themselves. Those on the left side overwhelmingly, but not
exclusively, involve guilty defendants, and defenders who
work on their cases hopefully do so because they do not care
about guilt and work to keep the system honest. Those on the
right side more likely involve innocent defendants, although
the vast majority are guilty, but the perception of a strong
defense case and defending potentially innocent clients
should typically call forth a strong defense effort, and many
clients will correctly accept the generous plea deals offered by
the prosecution in these weak cases.
The middle part of the chart is the most problematic.
The most questionable situations occur here, and despite the
defendant's protestations of innocence, lawyers rationally
evaluating the case would conclude the client was likely
guilty. This conclusion can be reached by a rational defense
attorney, even where objective evidence of guilt is middling. I
place Innocent Client #2 in this area since his case was
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objectively in the middle part of the chart, and he was
relatively unpersuasive in part because of his past record.
This same rational lawyer would certainly reach the
subjective conclusion of guilt if her client were unpersuasive,
but might reach that conclusion when the objective evidence
was weaker still.
79
The potential problem with caring about innocence is
illustrated by the reactions of the rational lawyer to the
persuasive client, which could produce a privileged status for
such clients if the defender generally responds with special
care for those perceived to be potentially innocent. I suggest
through the listed reactions in the final row that even when
the objective evidence of guilt is relatively strong, a
persuasive client can cause a defender to break out of the
normal operating premise of guilt and subjectively
contemplate innocence.
Admittedly, there may be insider knowledge that is not
within the category of prosecution or defense evidence short
of a confession that gives weight to raw subjective reactions.
Many of those markers, however, will be ambiguous. The
facts of Innocent Client #2's case, again, present a useful
illustration. A rational defense attorney might appropriately
begin to question the truthfulness of her client's claims of
innocence if his defense could not be verified with other
witnesses. For example, if the defense is an alibi, doubt
might begin when the defendant's companion recalls events
on the critical evening entirely differently. Or the companion
might remember it the same, but the episode of the television
show the defendant and/or the witness remember watching
might not have played the night in question. Or the critical
event to date the alibi-the arrival of his sister's newborn-
might have been a day later or a day earlier than he claimed.
When such conflicting information is revealed, the defendant
might change alibis; the alibi witness(es) might remember
they watched a different television program together, which
did air at the critical time; or the client might acknowledge
being at the scene, but deny being involved. Throughout, the
client might nevertheless be steadfast in insisting that he is
79. The same set of results should be produced in the last two rows based on
the general biases of defense counsel rather than the different persuasiveness of
the client. If the attorney is easily convinced, the next to last row is reproduced;
if the defender is skeptical, then the last row is reproduced.
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innocent.80 The truth, however, remains unclear in all these
situations.
Theoretically, some modification of the defense counsel
role would likely be possible in cases where an apparently
sane and rational defendant confesses her guilt to her defense
attorney, which I assume happens most often in cases with
strong objective evidence of guilt."' Indeed such a process
frequently occurs in the current system as lawyers move
clients in hopeless cases from initial protestations of
innocence toward guilty pleas. As Braccialarghe notes, the
British system imposes substantial constraints on attorneys
when the defendant has confessed guilt,8 2 and our Supreme
Court has indicated ethical constraints can be considered in
determining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel.8 3
The American right to a trial by jury under the Sixth
Amendment is not dependent on any judicial determination
that guilt and innocence is even slightly debatable. 4 With
the unrestricted right to trial, there would also be a right to
counsel to assure that the trial is fair, provide procedural
regularity, and an ultimate jury determination of guilt.
Presumably, however, the role of the lawyer could be modified
when the defendant has freely admitted his guilt that would
limit the range of defenses counsel could assist in offering
80. As noted earlier, Ronald Cotton's case, which is well known in the
innocence community, involved a client who presented multiple alibis. See
supra note 9 and accompanying text. The first was given at the time of his
arrest to the police, who disproved his story. Frontline: What Jennifer Saw,
supra note 9. According to his trial lawyer, he presented two others to him,
creating a difficult situation regarding his client's credibility: "The alibi defense
is not credible if it was inconsistent." Id. Ultimately, the defense introduced a
family alibi, which was not received well by the jury: "I believe the jury felt his
family was trying to protect him . .. ." Id.
81. This possibility is shown on the chart by the use of parentheses.
82. Braccialarghe, supra note 49, at 82 (referencing the code of conduct for
the bar of England and Wales).
83. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174-75 (1986) (ruling that the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel was not violated where the
lawyer concluded the client would perjure himself if he testified that he acted in
self defense [because of prior inconsistent statement to the attorney regarding
whether the defendant had seen a weapon in the victim's possession] and
threatened to inform the trial court of the apparent perjury and to withdraw
and impeach the client's statement, as permitted under state ethics rules, if the
client took the stand).
84. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) (stating derisively
that "[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty").
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that would not offend the right to trial or the right to
assistance of counsel.
In this article, I am far more concerned with reality and
practicality than theoretical possibilities. "Knowing" that
one's client is guilty is theoretically easy to imagine, and it is
frequently the situation for defenders. However, actually
knowing that the client is guilty and knowing when one
knows, rather than the lawyer believing that she knows when
she only has strong reason to suspect, can be situations that
are difficult to clearly distinguish. Although I will
acknowledge it is not always impossible to determine guilt to
a substantial degree of certainty, true certainty of guilt,
rather than some relatively high likelihood of it, is absent
from the vast majority of cases. The overwhelming sense of
guilt can crowd out the thoughts of innocence, which is often
very much harder to corroborate.
I contend that defense lawyers clearly cannot care about
guilt and do their critical job as guardians of the innocent. It
is almost as threatening to the innocent for defense attorneys
to care about innocence when it makes its way into the
picture. The danger in caring about innocence, which at first
is counterintuitive, holds true nevertheless because many of
the innocent lack clear indicators of their innocence or
characteristics of personal persuasion to make up for their
lack of proof. Those who care intensely about innocence
should applaud the ignoring of guilt (and innocence) in most
cases by defense attorneys at the trial level rather than
questioning or criticizing it. If there is to be a group of
lawyers who will do the task of defending vigorously, they
must be given some room to care individually and intensely
about their clients and defense efforts recognized as valid and
meritorious service even for the majority who are predictably
guilty.
V. THE JOB AND MINDSET OF THOSE ASSIGNED TO DEFEND
ALL COMERS-THE ALMOST NECESSARY ABSENCE OF
CONCENTRATION ON QUESTIONS OF GUILT (AND INNOCENCE)
Before I examine whether defense attorneys caring about
guilt and innocence is consistent with their protective
function as vigorous advocates, I begin with the sociology of
those who work as full time defenders of the accused. For
those who find the role of the public defender or appointed
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counsel to defend people who are mostly guilty a necessary-
but not a particularly noble-role, the question of how such
lawyers sustain themselves will be of scant interest. For
those who consider an adequate defense for the great mass of
defendants who are indigent to be a cornerstone of our
country's aspirational commitment to equal justice, the
personal and professional survival of thousands of defense
attorneys committed to zealous advocacy has enormous
practical impact.
A. A Typology of Defender Motivations
In assessing the possible impact that a focus on guilt and
innocence might have on defenders, some typology of the
motivations of defenders is helpful. I suggest there are four
major categories: (1) The Tester of Factual or Legal Guilt, (2)
The Rights Protector, (3) The Protector of and Aid to the
Downtrodden, and (4) The Competitor.5
The first category-The Tester of Factual or Legal
Guilt-is the one most directly involved in this article. The
motivation of these lawyers roughly centers on the arguments
that determining facts is often difficult, leading to inherent
uncertainty as to factual guilt, and thus, despite the good
faith efforts of prosecutors, conviction of the innocent remains
a reality. As a result, defense lawyers are needed to protect
the factually innocent. Even if we know what happened,
many cases turn on issues of human motivation and
responsibility, which may remain uncertain or which may
properly be viewed from different perspectives. Thus,
lawyers also play this role, even when the issue is legal guilt
rather than factual innocence. Finally, in death penalty
cases, defense attorneys are critical to reaching an
appropriate judgment as to punishment."6
85. I am deeply indebted to Professor Barbara Babcock's insights in framing
these categories. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 175, 177-78 (1983-1984) (describing categories of motivation). She
presents five types of motivation: (1) The Garbage Collector's Reason, (2) The
Legalistic or Positivist's Reason, (3) The Political Activist's Reason, (4) The
Social Worker's Reason, and (5) The Egotist's Reason. Id. I reordered the
categories and have changed the titles to give them a more contemporary feel
(the description is a quarter-of-a-century old) and to state the purposes more
positively.
86. Professor Babcock labeled this category "The Legalistic or Positivist's
Reason" and put no emphasis on the difficulty of determining factual guilt. Id.
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The second category-The Rights Protector-houses
arguments flowing from the command of the Sixth
Amendment under our adversarial system for equal justice
and the contention that in protecting those least loved,
defenders support the foundation of the liberties of all. The
third category-The Protector of the Downtrodden-contains
elements of social work and political cause. 7 Most of those
charged with crimes come from impoverished backgrounds
and present a host of social maladies. Somewhere in the mix
of motivations to enter defender work is likely at least the
potential for empathy for defendants who typically come from
impoverished backgrounds and may be members of racial
minority groups. Few defenders are likely drawn to the work
to perform a social work function, but in reality, much of a
defender's work has this function. For those who endure,
success in the social work function often becomes a fulfilling
element of the job. The fourth category-The Competitor-
captures the personal ego satisfaction that sustains litigators.
It is the selfish joy of winning. For defenders, this joy may be
more infrequent because the prosecution typically has the
stronger case, but the victories are more enjoyable when they
come to an underdog.
When I worked at the Washington, D.C. PDS from 1976
until 1983, we did not talk frequently about innocence. In
at 177. I see her characterization as somewhat anachronistic and reflective of a
time before irrefutable DNA exonerations raised the salience of factual
innocence. Perspectives, even among defense attorneys, on issues of innocence
change. Although the difference is largely one of focus for Babcock, the change
of perspective on the likelihood of factual innocence can be placed in perspective
by going back in history further and looking to the often quoted statement of
Judge Learned Hand set out below:
Why . .. [the defendant] should in advance have the whole evidence
against him to pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or
foully, I have never been able to see . . . . Our procedure has been
always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an
unreal dream.
United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). I find Hand's
statement no longer recognizable, given the DNA exonerations and Babcock's
lack of focus on potential factual innocence surprising to a contemporary reader.
87. Professor Babcock divided this category into two: "The Political
Activist's Reason" and "The Social Worker's Reason." Babcock, supra note 85,
at 178. Having a separate Political Activist's category was more
understandable in the period shortly after the civil rights movement of the
1960s and 1970s, and it remains appropriate for many who defend death
penalty cases. My sense of contemporary motivation is that the overtly political
element is, at present, substantially less strong for ordinary defenders.
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justifying our work to ourselves, we did not concentrate on
what I have termed the role of Tester of Factual or Legal
Guilt,"8 which I highlight because it is that role that justifies
the defense attorney's vigorous defense of all to acquit the
unidentified innocents. As I noted, I acted somewhat
differently for Innocent Client #1 because I believed he was
innocent, but what I did can properly be viewed as simply the
appropriate tactical response to the particular case, rather
than a suggestion of general difference in treatment of
apparently innocent clients. My inquiry in this section is
whether full-time public defenders and active appointed
counsel can survive professionally and personally and act
generally upon their belief in the innocence of clients. This is
relevant to the question of whether there could be a general
or special duty of care for some class of clients where
innocence is believed or particularly likely.
B. The Professional and Personal Motivations that Sustain
Defenders
At PDS, as I assume with public defenders generally, we
had no clearly articulated justifications for our work either at
an office-wide level or individually. I saw and felt elements of
all four of the motivational categories described above. The
most common articulation was the systemic justification set
out in the second category-"The Protector of Rights." We
certainly believed that a major consequence and purpose of
our work was to keep the criminal justice process honest,
which should help those who are innocent, but our focus was
on the immediate goal of maintaining a fair process. We
were, in this way, lawyers working for a cause.8 9  Thus,
88. I have no reason to believe conversations have changed much from my
time until today. However, in one specific, although I assume minor, way,
conversations with defendants have changed in Washington, D.C. to specifically
discuss innocence. The conversation is the result of the Innocence Protection
Act of 2001, which gives the defendant a personal right for DNA testing and
defense attorneys regularly discuss that right with clients. See D.C. CODE § 22-
4131 (2002). Attorneys have an obligation to inform their clients of the right to
have DNA tests performed that might support claims of innocence that the
client makes. Id.
89. See Susan Bandes, Repression and Denial in Criminal Lawyering, 9
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 359 (2006). On the other hand, it seems to me that,
for some defense attorneys who specialize in areas such as Innocence Projects or
capital defense, the overall cause may motivate and sustain. Professor Bandes
does not find the "cause lawyering" label as particularly useful in capturing the
[Vol:50
20101 CARE ABOUT INNOCENCE 61
working for a larger cause is somewhere in their motivation,
but for most defenders, that is not what sustains them on a
day-to-day basis.
In her insightful article, Repression and Denial in
Criminal Lawyering, Professor Susan Bandes examines the
emotional and psychological impact upon defenders of
representing largely, but not universally, guilty individuals,
many of whom have caused pain to others and face the
prospect of harsh punishment themselves.9' On the support
side of the ledger, Bandes, drawing from numerous personal
accounts of defenders, notes the central focus and sustaining
motivation is the client: "One common thread among those
who maintain a commitment to defense work is the
importance of the connection to one's client, and the
importance of keeping his needs concrete and immediate."9'1
As Professor Bandes describes, the lawyers at the Public
Defender Service most centrally represented people in need-
we had clients and saw ourselves as their vigorous and loyal
lawyers.92 Representing clients is the obvious centerpiece of
what public defenders do. Lawyers, no doubt, go into
defender work because they are drawn to a general cause, but
the sense of mission at PDS was not felt immediately as being
to a cause-the cause of justice-but to individual clients. 93
motivation of capital defenders, who often work a case or client at a time rather
than viewing their efforts systemically about capital punishment. Id.
Moreover, the cause may be vague or multifaceted and is captured in the
concept of the continued fight rather than the success of a cause: "They may be
energized by challenging, and preferably thwarting, authority, by fighting for
the underdog, or by their political commitments." Id.
90. See generally id.
91. Id. at 357. See also id. at 347-48 (quoting David Feige, How to Defend
Someone You Know Is Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, § 6 (Magazine) at 59-
60) ("1I care about the person I know .... It is his tears I see, his hand I hold
and his mother I console."). Bandes described her own emotional support for
her work when she worked as an appellate defender as follows:
We felt loyalty to each other, and turned to each other for support.
Most of all, we felt loyalty to our clients. We knew them and their
families as human beings, we cared about them, and we drew much of
our strength and motivation from their desperate need for our help.
Our clients' needs were serious, immediate, and palpable.
Bandes, supra note 89, at 350.
92. One pedantic way to describe the work of PDS and other public
defenders is that of a service agency, helping our clients negotiate with a hostile
government agency, which was interlaced with our sense that our work
facilitated our client in maintaining some level of autonomy.
93. Among one of her many powerful insights, Professor Abbe Smith notes
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We defended the guilty and innocent alike, but we tried to
win cases and more particularly to do our best for our clients,
whom we saw principally as clients and individuals rather
than consciously recognizing them as either guilty or innocent
clients.
Recognizing a special duty for the apparently or likely
innocent would, I believe, be so inconsistent with the moral
imperative that helps criminal defense attorneys continue
their work that it would be professionally and personally
destructive. Professor Givelber writes of the positive
advantage of focusing on the contest rather than the merits
because most clients are guilty.94 If one treated defending the
likely guilty as explicitly a second order priority, one could
reasonably assume loss of morale for defense attorneys.95
Only occasionally would a defense lawyer have the
opportunity to do what would be considered "first priority"
work on an innocent person's case, 96 or perhaps the
perception of the work would change from coldly realistic ("I
don't care") to blindly unrealistic ("Most of my clients are
that "for the criminal defense lawyer, the client comes first" ahead of other lofty
concerns, including the difficult to discern matter of objective truth. See SMITH,
supra note 38, at 68.
94. See Givelber, supra note 24, at 1395-96 (arguing that defense counsel
have an interest in a status quo that does not concentrate on acquitting the
innocent because the present system, which attempts to try cases among the
guilty, likely results in more overall acquittals than might a system targeted on
the innocent, because some criminal defense attorneys are attracted to the
present contest of wits and will involved in winning acquittals against the odds,
and because the common role of defense counsel is to represent the guilty).
95. Professor Givelber has argued:
Moreover, because cases of falsely convicted innocents may appear
indistinguishable from those of the correctly convicted guilty, defense
counsel may not be able to tell the difference .... Ideology matters as
well. At a minimum, defense counsel view their role as forcing their
government to secure convictions in an open and lawful manner.
Securing acquittals for the guilty serves the important end of forcing
the government to follow its own rules even its treatment of the most
despised members of the community .... Defense counsel may also
subscribe to the dominant assumption [to assume guilt] because any
other view might render their work emotionally and practically
unsupportable."
Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation and Data about the Acquitted, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2005).
96. See Raymond, supra note 20, at 457-61 (expressing concern about the
impact of the innocence movement on ordinary defense attorneys who are not
publicly acclaimed and who may feel, along with apparently guilty clients, left
behind).
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innocent").97
Professor Bandes also examines various mechanisms by
which criminal defense lawyers "distance themselves from
certain aspects of their work, either temporarily or more
permanently, while keeping other aspects salient.""8 Despite
various defense mechanisms, one real problem is "burnout,"
which illustrates a reason for not trying to "know" whether a
client is guilty. Indeed, avoiding such concern is highly useful
and arguably essential for professional survival.
Professor Barbara Babcock, who spent a number of years
at PDS,99 explains:
The defender goes down the treacherous path of burnout
once she concerns herself with guilt or innocence.
The defender must suspend belief (or disbelief) in
every case, and must be disinterested in either freeing the
guilty or protecting the innocent. Any other attitude
inevitably leads to corruption of the defender's role
because most of the accused are guilty. Once the defender
consciously recognizes this fact, her work becomes
insupportable and she is disabled. °°
Babcock emphatically means that defenders cannot care
about guilt or innocence. She appears to believe that the
defender cannot recognize that she is doing the work because
of the first motivation that I have described-The Tester of
Factual or Legal Guilt. Referring to the statement, "'Better
That Many Guilty Go Free Rather Than One Innocent Should
Suffer,"' she states: "These antique words imply that the job
of the defender is to protect the innocent, even if, in the
process, she participates in the freeing of the guilty. This is
simply wrong."1 '
97. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 33, at 117 (understating the likelihood
somewhat, "[n]o full-time criminal lawyer represents a significant number of
innocent clients", but asserting correctly, I believe, that the average defense
attorney has relatively few innocent clients, and, I would add, will not recognize
even those she has).
98. Bandes, supra note 89, at 351.
99. Babcock, supra note 85, at 175 n.* (explaining that she practiced as a
criminal defense attorney for eight years, working the first two in Edward
Bennett Williams's firm and then moving to PDS).
100. See Babcock, supra note 10, at 314-15. See also Babcock, supra note 85,
at 180 (observing that "the fundamental mind-set of most criminal defense
lawyers toward defending the guilty is one of staggering indifference to the
question").
101. See Babcock, supra note 10, at 314.
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She goes on to state:
The defender cannot view herself as part of a system-
even one with the quixotic ideal of freeing the guilty in
order to protect the innocent. Once part of the system, the
inevitable next step is for the defender to do what
everyone else in the system does: assume the guilt of the
accused and act accordingly. This means thinking of plea
bargains rather than defenses . . . and ultimately
collaborating completely by questioning the worth of the
defender's work. Only by staying outside the system
altogether can the defender act effectively and avoid the
self-doubt and ambivalence that leads to burnout.10
2
I believe that Babcock overstates the danger of ever
caring about either innocence or guilt. I agree that innocence
and its absence, guilt, cannot be the motive of the work;
discerning it cannot be the quest. Innocence cannot generally
be known in the cases that successfully make their way
through the system. But if I am correct that occasionally
attention may be paid to innocence, Babcock is mostly right.
She powerfully presents the almost certainly correct point
that regular focus, and certainly fixation, on that issue will
lead to professional destruction for trial-level defense
attorneys.
C. Defense Attorneys Who Specialize in Innocence and Trial
Lawyers Who Encounter Evidence of the Innocence of
Defendants Other than Their Clients
It is not that defense counsel lack direct professional
concern about innocence. Prominent lawyers, such as Barry
Scheck, are publicly involved in Innocence Projects, but their
work is principally focused on post-conviction litigation-
freeing the wrongly convicted. Also, occasional news stories
are published about lawyers who find evidence of other
clients' innocence during the representation of their own
clients.
I have written about the difficult situation Staples
Hughes faced in the Lee Wayne Hunt case when Hughes's
client, Jerry Cashwell, confessed that he alone had committed
the murders for which Hunt was also then being prosecuted,
and for which he was convicted and sentenced to life in
102. Id. at 315.
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prison.1"3 Hughes decided to reveal the information after his
client's suicide decades later, but he had never tried to do so
while his client was alive because he understood that the
revelation might harm his client's interests. Therefore, the
revelation would have been contrary to his ethical obligation.
Nevertheless, Hughes was haunted by the knowledge and the
responsibility his duty placed on him for the extended
incarceration of a man whom he knew to have been involved
in criminal activity, but was innocent of the murders for
which he had been convicted.10
4
The standard understanding, which Hughes did not
challenge, is that evidence of the innocence of another does
not justify harming the interests of the lawyer's own client by
divulging otherwise protected secrets. Indeed, the
prosecution and the trial judge agreed. Hughes's testimony
was excluded from consideration by the trial court on Hunt's
motion for a new trial because, inter alia, the court agreed
with the prosecution's argument that such testimony violated
Hughes's ethical duty to maintain client's confidences and
secrets and his client's attorney-client privilege, both of which
require lawyers to keep their clients' secrets inviolate without
an explicit exception for testimony supporting the
innocence.1 0 5  Within that limitation, a modest change in
ethics obligations could be fashioned that allows or requires
the revelation of innocence upon the death of the client 10 6 or it
could require revelation and include a form of immunity,
prohibiting government use against the client revealing the
information.1 07
103. See Mosteller, supra note 64, at 535-44.
104. See id. at 537.
105. See id. at 540-44.
106. The ABA Ethics, Gideon & Professionalism Committee are considering a
proposal drafted by co-chairs Professors Bruce Green and Ellen Yaroshevsky to
permit a lawyer to reveal the confidences of a deceased client if the lawyer
reasonably believes such revelation is necessary to prevent or rectify the
wrongful conviction of another. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal,
Confidentiality and Wrongful Incarceration, 23 CRIM. JUST. 46, 46-49 (2008).
The rule could also be expanded to require the attorney to request a waiver
from his or her client when the client possessed evidence exculpating another
and when circumstances other than death diminished the impact of the
disclosure.
107. In addition to its problematic nature as an alternative to privilege,
requiring disclosure and providing protection to the client who incriminates
herself is quite unlikely, given prosecutorial protestation that it would open the
door to manufactured claims of innocence by a third party.
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These almost surgical alterations in defense counsel
obligations to recognize the importance of innocence when it
does not directly or substantially harm the lawyer's client are
important, but they have little clear impact on day-to-day
defense work. The suggestive alterations are, however,
instructive about the growing view that innocence is,
perhaps, the primary justice system concern and should alter
defense counsel impact when compatible with their core
functions. But they give way and continue to support defense
counsel in maintaining their own clients' confidences if
important to protecting their clients' interests, even when
doing so denies exculpatory information to a non-client. The
duty to protect one's client at the cost of another who may be
innocent, however, does not conflict with giving defense
attorneys special duties to protect, with greater rigor, their
own clients who are likely innocent. Unfortunately, none of
the new rules speaks to the primary impediments to treating
those perceived as likely innocent with special care, which is
the difficulty of knowing which cases involve the innocent
absent a stunning admission (as occurred in the Hunt case),
and absent such knowledge, shortchanging other potentially
innocent clients as a consequence of giving special attention
to some simply because they are believed to be innocent.
VI. THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECIAL CONCERN FOR THE INNOCENT
I began work on this article because I wanted to
reexamine my long-accepted personal view, formed while I
worked as a public defender, that I could not care about
whether I believed my client to be guilty or innocent. I have
reached the conclusion that my earlier formed view is
fundamentally sound with respect to the day-to-day work of
public defenders. As a matter of theory, caring about guilt
and caring about innocence must equally be prohibited.
If resources are fixed, there can be no extra effort for any
case based on the apparent innocence of the defendant if all
clients are to be treated the same. Equality is destroyed just
as surely by increasing the effort for the apparently innocent
as it is by reducing it for the apparently guilty. That
theoretical conclusion, however, may not wholly decide the
issue in the practical world because the individual lawyer
effectively, or the system officially, might add resources for
the cases of the apparently innocent.
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A. The Individual Solution-More Work and Less Sleep
One might support a practical solution on the individual
defender level by occasionally increasing the time, effort, and
resources devoted to the case when the prospect of innocence
is observed. Regardless of what well-resourced offices, such
as PDS, do, no one can seriously contend that current efforts
by those assigned to represent indigent defendants
are uniformly excellent. Defender services are woefully
underfunded in many jurisdictions. Many indigent
defendants do not receive what would be termed the "full
treatment" in any retail setting. If the standard actual
practice is realistically far short of warm zeal, should it not be
possible to expect and, indeed, require that the "full
treatment," or at least warm zeal, be exerted as to some
cases, specifically for those reasonably believed to be
innocent?
The discussion in the previous section leads me to the
conclusion that generally caring about subjective reactions to
issues of guilt and, yes, of innocence, are incompatible with
sound defender work if applied broadly. The effort called
forth must relate to objective factors, such as the likelihood
that the effort would have some appreciable effect on the
outcome of the case with regard to punishment imposed.
Allocations based broadly on belief in innocence will take the
system down a slippery slope that begins with an initial
informal trial by the attorney to determine which defendants
are convincing enough to warrant full representation. The
change in practice will surely have an effect on shaping the
statements made by clients to their lawyers and further
constrain the information conveyed by defendants to their
lawyers.
On the other hand, one should not ignore human
reactions. I believe that most defense attorneys do have
special concern for innocent clients.108 As a psychological
108. Professor Babcock describes the defense attorney trying the case of a
client she believes is innocent as follows: "Those rare trials of a defendant whom
the lawyer truly believes to be innocent . . .are grueling and frightening
experiences, in which the usual will to win is elevated to a desperate desire to
succeed." Babcock, supra note 85, at 180. Professor Abbe Smith states that
"there is a stunning change of perspective when a lawyer represents an
innocent person. Suddenly there is nothing more important than the truth,
nothing more sacred .... Lawyers with innocent clients can become downright
desperate about the truth." SMITH, supra note 38, at 83.
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defense mechanism, they may not want to engage broadly
and frequently in the thought that clients may be innocent
because it will raise the emotional stakes. It is much more
comfortable not to have a clear opinion on guilt or
innocence-to assume that all the clients are individuals
worthy of a defense, but equal on the guilt/innocence
dimension. However, when defenders do reach the conclusion
of innocence, my anecdotal information and my personal
belief is that they typically do more for those clients, and they
try to accomplish this result by doing more for those clients
rather than less for the others. They consciously choose
individually to try to expand the resources available. This is
how I think it is ordinarily understood and justified. The
effort is to avoid shortchanging any other client because of
the belief in innocence of one client, but to add extra hours to
the work day by staying up later or getting up earlier, thereby
expanding the total effort and providing some additional
effort to the apparently innocent client.
However, shortchanging the defense of other clients not
perceived as innocent can and will ultimately occur.
Attempting to produce additional effort for apparently
innocent clients is impractical if it is a regular occurrence.
Only a limited number of extra hours are available in the
already busy life of a typical public defender. I make no claim
that criminal defense attorneys work harder than prosecutors
or civil practitioners. My claim is that defense attorneys
already have more cases and more productive work than time
allows. Many of us have had jobs where we are supposed to
spend a percentage of our time on one task, say one-third, and
the remaining time, say two-thirds, on another discrete task.
The problem, however, was that the first task, if properly
done, could easily be a full-time job. The work day obviously
could not be expanded to accommodate all of the productive
work within the job description, and the lawyer shortchanged
both tasks, but likely did proportionately more work on the
primary task. Shortchanging always effectively occurs, or
alternatively, productive work that reduces punishment is
replaced by belief in innocence as the determiner of effort.
This recognition that inequality results from caring more
about even the occasional innocent clients does not suggest
that it will not remain the chosen course of conduct for many
defense attorneys or that it is inevitably corrupting. In the
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practical world, it is likely the only accommodation that is
tolerable, but differential effort based on perception of
innocence remains fraught with the danger of corrupting the
essential role of guardian of a fair trial for all, including the
unperceived innocent clients, in addition to its potential for
psychological and physical damage. 10 9
B. The Systemic Solution-Expanding Resources for Clients
Where Objective Evidence Makes Innocence Significantly
Likely
Should defense attorneys ever be required to care about
innocence? Although I have expressed skepticism that
frequent extra effort because of merely a subjective belief in
the innocence of some clients is practical, objective evidence of
innocence does justify such additional effort. However, this
solution only works if, as a consequence of the objective
showing of innocence, the total of defense resources is
increased rather than taken from, thereby reducing resources
available to, other clients. The reason is that we will
inevitably omit truly innocent defendants from the preferred
group, and to the extent creating a preferred group reduces
their defense effort, we will have gained reductions in
erroneous convictions of the innocent in one group by an
increase in such convictions in another. 0
The recent proposed amendment to prosecutorial ethical
duties regarding the innocent could provide a guide for when
extra effort might be required. In February 2008, the ABA
House of Delegates adopted an amendment to the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct that requires the prosecutor to
seek to remedy a conviction if the prosecutor "knows of clear
and convincing evidence establishing" the innocence of a
convicted defendant.1 ' When there is clear and convincing
109. See supra Part V.B (discussing the potential burnout impact of caring
about innocence).
110. Critics of this analysis will note that tradeoffs virtually always must be
made outside and the question is whether more would be gained in overall
innocence protection. My argument throughout this article is based on the
factual premise that innocence is often mixed among the apparently guilty, even
for defense attorneys, and that clear markers are absent. I believe this is one of
the key lessons from the DNA exonerations: while they occurred in certain
classes of cases more often than other, they were very often indistinguishable on
the basis of then observable factors from other prosecutions.
111. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(h) (2008). The ABA
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evidence of innocence, defense attorneys could, and perhaps
should, have a special duty to care and to act more vigorously
and with greater support.
This high standard applicable to prosecutors in the post-
conviction setting might, at first blush, appear to be an
unusual selection. I suggest, however, that it is appropriate.
In the post- conviction setting, the prosecution's appropriate
posture is ordinarily to support the result reached at trial for
a host of reasons. However, actual knowledge of clear and
convincing evidence of guilt reasonably alters the prosecutor's
responsibility. Similarly, at the trial stage, giving different
treatment based on subjective assessments of guilt or
innocence is incompatible with the defender's responsibility to
represent all comers effectively. Nevertheless, once this high
showing is made, an exception can also be justified if joined
with the provision of extra resources.
The important point here is that the additional effort
should not detract from the duties to other clients. One could
argue that when the evidence of innocence rises to this level,
it is more than a personal duty of the attorney. It might be a
duty, but it should be a systemic imperative, not an
individual lawyer imperative. Defense counsel's duty to
provide a fair trial for all other clients is not diminished
because of the objective likelihood of the innocence of one.
The operating charter of the public defender agency
and/or the duties of judges in approving resources should be
amended to provide additional resources in this situation.
Innocence is a proper justification for the expansion of
defense resources beyond the level otherwise authorized. In
Ake v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that certain defense
services are a constitutional right because they are the basic
tools to an adequate defense.112 Where this showing of
revision also imposed a responsibility to investigate innocence if the prosecutor
"knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood"
of innocence. Id. at R. 3.8(g). Such an objective showing should already call for
vigorous effort by the defense since it is couched in terms of productive evidence
that would likely be outcome determinative, see supra Part IV.A, which would
already call forth a vigorous defense effort and would justify the approval of
addition defense services under Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
112. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (reversing a conviction and death sentence and
requiring, inter alia, the government to provide access to a psychiatrist on the
issue of his sanity at the time of the offense, in a situation where the record
showed strong evidence of significant psychiatric impairment and insanity was
the defense offered at trial).
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innocence is made, additional resources should be provided to
aid in investigation and preparation of the case. These
should be resources beyond the constitutional minimum
mandated by Ake and beyond those generally available to
defendants under statute or administrative regulations
because innocence is a value that should be given weight by
the justice system. This is not a re-shuffling of resources
already allocated. Rather, innocence should call forth the
provision of additional resources.
Thus, I believe a theoretical exception could be developed
to the general rule of equal treatment of clients based on
strong objective evidence of innocence. However, on closer
inspection, I conclude that it would be practically
insignificant or unworkable and likely counterproductive. It
would be practically insignificant because, in most situations
where the defense has such evidence, the prosecution would
independently reach the conclusion not to prosecute. 113  In
other cases, the normal human reaction of defense counsel to
follow productive leads and to care about innocence in such
cases will produce the same extra effort that I describe.
Thus, this proposal is of relatively little practical
importance, but it could be of meaningful assistance if the
criminal justice system were to develop ways to provide extra
113. One might wonder why there would be a prosecution if the defense
concludes that, from an objective standpoint, there is clear and convincing
evidence of innocence, or why this should be a directive for more defense
services rather than an additional directive to the prosecution. Should the
prosecution not dismiss the case, and should the defense attorney not merely
provide the evidence to the prosecution? An objective determination is not a
universal one. Some defense attorneys provide exculpatory evidence to
prosecutors whom they believe will evaluate it fairly if they consider a decision
not to prosecute is a viable possibility. In other situations, counsel anticipates
that the reaction of the prosecution will be to turn a blind eye to the possibility
of innocence and to use advanced notice of the evidence to prepare an
inculpatory explanation. For example, in the Duke lacrosse case, defense
counsel for Reade Seligmann provided documentary evidence of an apparently
"air tight" alibi to District Attorney Mike Nifong, only to have him indict their
client and send an investigator to re-interview the victim, producing a changed
version of the crime that undercut the effectiveness of the alibi. See Robert P.
Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: A
Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice," 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337, 1402-03,
1405-06 (2007). It is not only in extreme cases, such as the Duke lacrosse case,
or with unethical prosecutors like Mike Nifong, who respond aggressively to
proffers of innocence: many other defense attorneys have found their apparently
"air tight" alibis undercut when they revealed them to the prosecution, and
victims revised their time lines for the crime.
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resources to the defense of the objectively likely innocent." 4
The special duty should only be discussed if it is paired with a
responsibility for funding sources to provide extra funding
beyond that normally allocated when such a case is
encountered. However, I have difficulty imagining how the
objective showing could be made to any suitable fact-finder.
Presenting enough evidence to establish such a showing
would be practically impossible to a judge. Defense secrets
would likely need to be revealed and the time consumed
would be extraordinary in most situations. Without an
adversary to provide balance and assure the judge that no
significant contrary evidence exists in the case, no court could
be confident that it had a fair perspective and, therefore,
could not know whether the evidence was sufficient under a
clear and convincing standard.
An administrative body that oversees the public defender
office could maintain confidentiality, but its determination
would lack a full presentation of the government's proof and
any determination that strong objective evidence of innocence
existed might not be dispassionate. Granting extra funds
based on a finding of objective evidence of innocence might be
seen as, or actually become, a way to expand the agency's
budget. If the funds are not secured as extra resources
ordered by an accepted neutral decision maker, such as a
judge, the effect would likely be simply to reallocate the
budgeted funds already available to the defense. 115
I come to the conclusion that, although theoretically
114. Professor Darryl K. Brown has suggested rationing defense resources
based in part on the lessons from DNA about features of cases where
exonerations appeared to concentrate. See Brown, Institutional Design, supra
note 75, at 808, 821-28. Leaving aside the issue of whether DNA exonerations
provide a representative picture of the unknown and unknowable group of
wrongfully convicted defendants, his suggestion may provide a useful guide to
defense attorneys in targeting efforts that may develop evidence of innocence.
As a justification or excuse for why adequate funding is not or should not be
provided to fully defend others who may also be innocent, which I fear, the
proposal would be terribly misused.
115. The situation for prosecution review of a case after conviction is very
different. First, the trial evidence is known and new evidence can be evaluated
with regard to the earlier produced evidence. Finding a neutral fact-finder
remains a problem, but at least the duty under the rule to act, and the natural
bias to maintain the status quo, work in opposite directions and act as
something of an automatic check rather than being mutually reinforcing, and
budget expanding, as the determination of the public defender hierarchy would
be.
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possible to benefit the innocent by expanding defense
resources where supported by strong objective evidence, the
effort would likely be damaging. My instinct is that requiring
the defense to give special services to the likely innocent
would invite the creation of a "wedge issue" regarding
defender funding. Any effort to distinguish between the
likely innocent and other defendants regarding funding will
almost inevitably lead to reduction in funding for the group of
guilty defendants. If there is any way to separate the cases
worthy of special funding, the ostensible removal of the most
meritorious cases from the body of cases where indigent
funding is required will likely lead to a reduction in funding
for the great mass of cases. I cannot be certain that extra
funds would not be granted to cases where the defendant was
likely innocent without making a compensating reduction in
another part of the overall allocation of funds for indigent
defense. However, like the approach that would restrict
defense efforts for the clearly guilty, an effort to give
additional services to those that are very likely innocent
would almost necessarily undermine the broad appeal and
the political support of the current system of indigent
defense.
C. Breaking Down Stereotypes and Recognizing that
Expanded Support for All Defenders is Critical to Protecting
the Innocent
I want now to look beyond the potential "wedge issue"
and suggest the embrace of innocence as the prime concern
and as providing the missing support for long-needed
additional resources to defend all indigent defendants.116 I
recognize that this will be a difficult task. "Hard boiled"
public defenders, among which I include myself, may feel that
couching support for defense services on the basis of
protecting the innocent approaches the disingenuous and may
116. Arguing for increased support for public defenders is at least strongly
optimistic and more likely unrealistic. Budget cuts to states and localities
associated with the economic downturn appear to be producing cutbacks in
funding. See Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 9, 2008, at Al (describing litigation in seven jurisdictions by
public defenders to limit caseloads based on reduced government funding and
rising caseloads). But at least those concerned about innocence should add their
voices to those advocating adequate, and eventually expanded, resources.
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ultimately prove counterproductive as a wedge argument
later develops and turns the effort against itself. Defenders
do represent clients for multiple other reasons beyond
innocence, and they clearly represent defendants who are
demonstrably guilty. Nevertheless, in the new environment
that emphasizes the importance of procedures that protect
the innocent, the importance of well-funded defender services
is the most important way that unidentified innocent
defendants can be protected.117
Moreover, to date, there is scant evidence that the
argument has been accepted that more funds for the defense
are needed because innocent defendants have been convicted
in intolerably high numbers. Notorious cases involving the
conviction of the innocent do seem to have been important in
achieving more targeted reforms, such as the enactment of
legislation authorizing DNA testing,1 18 development of new
identification protocols, 9  and enactment of expanded
discovery.120  Recognition of these erroneous convictions has
not led to more generous funding for defense services
117. Others have noted the potential of contemporary concern for the
innocent who have been wrongfully convicted to support greater funding for
indigent defense services. See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to
Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1036,
1128 (2006) (arguing that concern expressed regarding wrongful convictions can
be a compelling argument for having functionally strong defense representation
and recommending publicity regarding the failure of the system and assembly
line justice for the innocent to build a constituency for reform of the inadequate
indigent defense systems); Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense
Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 261 (2004)
(noting that publicity regarding wrongful convictions uncovered through DNA
evidence has enhanced the public's concern for accuracy in criminal convictions
and might permit refraining the defense funding issue as an investment in
accuracy).
118. See Innocence Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3600-3600A (2006),
42 U.S.C. § 14163 (2006) (providing both a right to defendants to secure DNA
testing and providing greater defense services in state capital punishment
cases).
119. See Mosteller, supra note 113, at 1388-92 (describing how DNA
exonerations demonstrated the weaknesses of eyewitness identification
evidence and helped produce an innocence-based identification protocol).
120. See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to
the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File
Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 272-76 (2008) (discussing how in North
Carolina, concern about the apparently erroneous conviction of Alan Gell, which
was uncovered because of a post-conviction discovery statute applicable only to
death penalty cases, led the legislature to similarly expand discovery in all
felony cases).
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generally. Instead, the impact appears to be targeted on
reforms that would benefit the innocent, except for death
penalty litigation where additional funds have been provided
by Congress to increase the overall level of representation.121
The argument that more is needed across the board to help
protect against errors, if broadly made, has not been received.
Nevertheless, the argument is sound. When innocence is
unknowable as an objective matter, we depend upon the jury
to discern the truth. My argument in this article is that
knowledge of innocence is far less available than is implicitly
assumed. We can often know who the clearly guilty are, and
in the vast majority of cases, they plead guilty. Sometimes
through trace evidence, we gain knowledge that a defendant
is among the clearly guilty. Finding the actually innocent
among those who are not clearly guilty is often a matter of
luck, generally a matter of hard work, and I believe more
often than we want to admit, a matter of uncertainty. That
process of sorting these difficult cases usually only works if
the facts are adequately gathered and examined. When we
turn, as we must, to the judgment of twelve jurors, the
efficacy of the decision process depends upon full and effective
presentation on both sides. I do not claim that prosecutor's
offices are lavishly funded, for they are not, but across much
of America, defenders are woefully underfunded.'22  For
innocence to be protected in that group of cases where it is
objectively unknowable, adequate funding for defense services
is the greatest need and the most pressing reform.
Because of the importance of adequate defense services to
the unidentified innocent, those who focus on procedures
designed to highlight the innocent should recognize support
for broader defender funding as supportive of their general
commitment to the innocent, although not targeted. The
procedures supported by this group of reformers tend to help
subclasses of defendants whose cases have certain factual
features, such as biological trace evidence, which may be
linked to specific individuals and will exonerate others by
121. See Innocence Protection Act of 2004 § 14163 (providing funding for
enhanced defense services in state capital punishment case).
122. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1045 (2006) ("By
every measure in every report analyzing the U.S. criminal justice system, the
defense function for poor people is drastically underfinanced.")
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DNA profiling. I believe that all of these efforts assume there
is a knowledgeable and equipped defender to help the system
fairly apply the new procedures. As these specific reforms
move forward and if they gain momentum, I suggest that
reformers explicitly support expanded funding for defense
counsel and their support services to ensure the system's
efficient operation and to provide some protection to the
innocent defendants whose cases fit into no special category,
who lack obvious signs of innocence, and who might have
committed crimes in the past so they appear among the
"usual suspects." '123
CONCLUSION
In this article, I reexamine the foundation for the
attitude of trial-level public defenders that they are not
concerned whether they believe their clients are guilty. Of
course, that implies they are not concerned even if they
believe their clients are innocent. I contend, however, that
the former is the most important position. If the subjective
determination of guilt mattered, then one would assume a
lower level of representation would be given to those whose
protestations of innocence were disbelieved.
I find no basis to rethink that position, even though
innocence is now a prime concern of the public. Innocent
Client #2 and the myriad of others like him who appear guilty
and have no compelling defense are the poster children for
maintaining the traditional posture of unconcern with guilt.
Indeed, the justification for defense counsel's lack of concern
about guilt is that it clearly puts one person-the client's
lawyer-in a duty-bound position to try to challenge the
government's case. For those in the situation of Innocent
123. In his book, Professor George Thomas focuses on the failures of our
justice system to protect the innocent. GEORGE C. THOMAS III, THE SUPREME
COURT ON TRIAL: HOW THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM SACRIFICES INNOCENT
DEFENDANTS (2008). He proposes a number of innovations, but begins with a
radical proposal to fix the inadequate system of representation for the accused:
he would create a group of criminal law specialists who would represent both
sides. Id. at 187-96. Although Thomas's proposal is not along the lines that I
suggest to increase defender resources, it has a kinship, in that he puts the need
for quality counsel at the center of his innocence reforms. See also George C.
Thomas III, When Lawyers Fail Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the Ghosts that
Haunt the Criminal Justice Systems, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 25 (providing a more
extensive treatment of the counsel argument that adequate and equal
representation of the defendant is critical to protecting the innocent).
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Client #2, but who do not receive his miraculous exoneration,
the defense attorney who provides a vigorous defense with its
opportunity to uncover evidence of innocence, even when she
would have no reason to believe innocence likely, remains the
client's major hope.
Prosecutors are duty bound to care about innocence in
part because even their subjective beliefs have a different
impact. First, they can act on their beliefs. They can dismiss
a case if they judge it to lack merit. The defense attorney
cannot. The subjective judgment can affect professional
conduct for the prosecutor; it cannot result in lessening
defense effort for a client because his lawyer's intuition does
not discern innocence. Like U.S. Marshal Gerard in arresting
Kimble, the defense attorney must defend regardless of her
subjective belief.
On the other hand, I suggest that defenders do care about
innocence even though they theoretically cannot. While
defenders' first and general response is not to care about
either guilt or innocence, they individually only strictly hold
the line at not caring about guilt. We already have a rough
proxy for a rule of special attention to the innocent in the
expected human response of defense attorneys when likely
innocence is encountered. In The Fugitive, it turns out that
U.S. Marshal Gerard does, in fact, care when he sees a basis
to doubt of Kimble's guilt, and Gerard becomes Kimble's most
important ally once he concludes that Kimble is innocent.
However, that never keeps Gerard from doing his job and
arresting Kimble. "I don't care" operates to mean that he
must arrest Kimble, but it doesn't mean that if convinced of
the truth of the claim of innocence, he will ignore the critical
truth. Perhaps the best we can do is to depend upon the
morality of defense attorneys to go the extra mile when they
believe they see innocence.
Thus, I offer no solution to the apparent anomaly that
while the public and other actors in the criminal justice
system are increasingly focused on innocence, defense
attorneys cannot care at all about guilt and cannot treat
innocence as a central professional concern. Why? Because
an attitude of not caring about either is the only way defense
attorneys can survive personally and professionally and
functionally perform their critical work of protecting the
innocent. The contrary arguments for role reformulation
2010]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
work no better today than earlier, but despite the difficulties,
defenders do respond to innocence when they occasionally
believe they see it. Moreover, adhering to the goal of equal
treatment of defendants, regardless of defense attorneys'
subjective views of their guilt or innocence, remains the
primary protection for those who are innocent because too
often innocence is not only unknowable, but comes with no
clear markers even for insiders.
I have discussed that recognizing a limited duty of the
defense attorney to act with greater vigor fits our system if it
is based on substantial objective evidence in the small
subclass of cases where the defense discovers pre-trial the
possibility of something approaching objective proof of
innocence. However, the theoretical proposal fails because of
insuperable difficulties with making a showing of objective
evidence of clear and convincing evidence of innocence. Also,
the key requirement that such additional responsibility by
the defense attorney must mean additional resources beyond
those otherwise available cannot be satisfied. Unfortunately,
little prospect exists for additional allocation of funds for
criminal defense that is truly additional rather than a de
facto reallocation of the funds that otherwise would have been
allocated if the focus is on further supporting only the
innocent among those charged.
In the end, the innocence movement should, as it did for
death penalty cases, 124 provide the emphasis for long-needed
additional resources for defender programs. More often than
guilt, innocence is unknown and unknowable on the basis of
objective evidence. Defending the innocent cannot be the
animating force of indigent defenders, or they lose their
ability to defend fully those who are innocent, but have no
real proof of it, and little other than their expected claim "I
didn't do it." Despite their apparent indifference to the claim,
the defenders' role as uncritical champion for these innocent
defendants is essential, and to be effective, they must be
supported by adequate resources.
124. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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